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Article 
Constitutional Reasonableness 
Brandon L. Garrett† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The concept of reasonableness pervades constitutional doc-
trine. The concept has long served to structure common-law doc-
trines, from negligence to criminal law, but its rise in constitu-
tional law is more recent.1 This Article aims to unpack three 
dimensions of constitutional reasonableness: (1) what the term 
reasonable means in constitutional doctrine; (2) which actors it 
applies to; and (3) how it is used. First, the underlying concept 
of reasonableness that courts adopt varies, with judges using 
competing objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based 
standards. For some rights, courts incorporate more than one 
usage at the same time.2 Second, the objects of the reasonable-
ness standard vary, assessed from the perspective of judges, of-
ficials, legislators, or citizens, and from the perspective of indi-
vidual decisionmakers, or general institutional or government 
perspectives.3 Third, judges may variously apply a constitutional 
 
†  Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law and White 
Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs, University of Virginia 
School of Law. Many thanks to Kerry Abrams, Anne Coughlin, Barry Friedman, 
Toby Heytens, Aziz Huq, Dotan Oliar, Chris Slobogin, Larry Solum, and David 
Zaring for their thoughtful comments; to participants at UVA Law incubator 
lunch for their comments; and to Elizabeth Hoffman for invaluable research as-
sistance. Copyright © 2017 by Brandon L. Garrett. 
 1. For an important early commentary on the growing usage of reasona-
bleness in constitutional rights discourse, see George P. Fletcher, The Right and 
the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985). 
 2. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based 
Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 250 (1996) (“The domi-
nant standards of liability in tort require an objective reasonableness calculus 
of social costs and benefits.”). 
 3. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer ’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–22 (1988) (outlining significance of “implicit male norms” in 
the reasonable person standard); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment 
with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 465–67 (1997) (discussing challenges of 
reasonable person evaluation in sexual harassment); Kit Kinports, Criminal 
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reasonableness standard to the assertion of defenses, waivers, or 
limitations on obtaining a remedy for the violation of a constitu-
tional right. The use of the common term reasonableness to such 
different ends can blur distinctions between rights and reme-
dies. Ultimately, I argue that the flexibility and malleability of 
reasonableness standards accounts for their ubiquity and utility. 
Constitutional standards can—and have—shifted their meaning 
entirely, as judges move from one concept or usage of reasona-
bleness, while appearing not to depart from precedent. That am-
biguity across multiple dimensions explains both the attraction 
and the danger of constitutional reasonableness. In this Article, 
I ultimately point to an opportunity in the spread of these doc-
trines. I argue that there is a better way to conduct constitu-
tional reasonableness: a regulatory approach, in which reasona-
bleness is informed by objective and empirically informed 
standards of care. 
One could be forgiven for thinking that the concept of rea-
sonableness should be largely irrelevant to constitutional law. 
Only one constitutional provision refers to reasonableness in its 
text. The Fourth Amendment provides a right to be free from an 
“unreasonable” search and seizure.4 That Clause has engen-
dered complex case law concerning topics as wide-ranging as use 
of deadly force, police surveillance, and automobile searches, all 
relying to varying degrees on different concepts of reasonable-
ness. Some Supreme Court rulings consist of all-things-consid-
ered assessments of the costs and benefits of searches;5 in other 
Fourth Amendment areas, the Court asks judges to examine cit-
izens’ reasonable expectations of privacy, sometimes admitting 
evidence of their subjective beliefs; while in others, the focus is 
the perspective of a reasonable police officer.6 
 
Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72–73 (2007) (ex-
plaining the evolution of the reasonable person standard); Alan D. Miller & Ro-
nen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 391–92 (2012) (argu-
ing for normative conception). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397–99 (1989) 
(“[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them . . . .” (citing Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978))); Brandon Garrett & Seth Stough-
ton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 301–02 (2017) (“A tac-
tical Fourth Amendment analysis would focus on whether officers acted con-
trary to sound police tactics by unreasonably creating a deadly situation . . . .”); 
see infra Part II.B. 
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Yet that is just the beginning. Each of those breeds of rea-
sonableness review can be found in a range of other constitu-
tional doctrines lacking any textual reference to reasonableness. 
Over the past three decades, in a range of constitutional doc-
trines, the Supreme Court has tightened its embrace of reason-
ableness and replaced a series of substantive standards for con-
stitutional review with objective reasonableness standards. How 
do we decide if a government official receives qualified immunity 
from civil liability? We ask whether the official acted reasonably. 
How do we decide if a police officer properly used deadly force? 
We ask whether the officer acted reasonably under the circum-
stances. How do we decide whether a constitutional criminal pro-
cedure violation deserves a remedy? We ask whether the error 
would have affected a reasonable decision by the jurors.7 How do 
we decide if a state judge correctly interpreted the Constitution 
in a criminal appeal? We ask whether the judge interpreted the 
Constitution reasonably.8 In Williams v. Taylor, Justice O’Con-
nor noted that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to 
define.”9 However, she said, “it is a common term in the legal 
world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its 
meaning.”10 The commonplace, but highly inconsistent, uses of 
the word reasonable may not, however, suggest any settled 
meaning—particularly where constitutional interpretation is 
concerned. 
In Part I of this Article, I explore three dimensions to the 
usages of constitutional reasonableness. The first dimension 
raises the question of the referent: What is reasonableness? 
Commentators have long critiqued reasonable man and reason-
able person standards in common law fields for assuming per-
spectives that, in fact, bring in non-objective assumptions about 
conduct. In constitutional law, those questions are equally im-
portant, and there are also questions about whether a reasona-
bleness standard need be objective at all. The Supreme Court 
has expressed concerns with subjective tests, which can lead to 
“an expedition into the minds” of officials, and “produce a grave 
and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.”11 Thus, the 
 
 7. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1970) (establishing reasonable 
doubt rule for juvenile defendants); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 
(1895) (establishing reasonable doubt rule for the federal defense of insanity).  
 8. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989). 
 9. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). 
 10. Id. 
 11. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984) (quoting Massa-
chusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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Court has said, in the Fourth Amendment context, that “objec-
tive standards of conduct” better produce “evenhanded law en-
forcement” than “standards that depend upon the subjective 
state of mind of the officer.”12  
Yet the temptation to adopt subjective tests remains. For 
example, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, rational basis review ostensibly asks judges to def-
erentially review reasonable government decisions—yet some-
times the Court asks whether a discriminatory purpose or ani-
mus renders the action irrational or unreasonable.13 Nor is it 
always clear how an objective reasonableness test works. In con-
trast to negligence law, constitutional balancing is rarely utili-
tarian, explicitly balancing costs and benefits. Often it is not 
clearly defined what factors may be balanced or how. Judges 
may call the resulting balance reasonable, but it is not always 
clear why.14 Moreover, sometimes judges do not want to balance, 
but rather declare certain types of actions per se unreasonable. 
The resulting uneven coverage of a reasonableness test can 
make the constitutional inquiry part objective and part some-
thing else.15 Such rulings may have the flavor of negligence and 
contract doctrines that rely on custom or industry practice to in-
form what is reasonable—which I argue is a preferable ap-
proach—or they may consist of judicial declarations of per se rea-
sonableness. 
A second problem exists: constitutional rights both set ex-
pectations for citizens and regulate government actors. The sec-
ond dimension asks: Who or what is the object of the reasonable-
ness standard—which citizens, government officials, or entities 
are being held to a standard of reasonableness? Often it is not 
clear—or, it is clear, but the answer varies from right to right or 
claim to claim. In some areas, the Supreme Court varies its ob-
ject, from the reasonable civilian, to the reasonable police officer, 
to the reasonable judge assessing the claim, to the reasonable 
defense attorney.16 Should the Fourth Amendment respect rea-
sonable individual expectations of privacy, or an officer’s reason-
 
 12. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). 
 13. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding that law’s 
“sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it af-
fects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
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able belief that a search was necessary? The individual’s subjec-
tive belief that they were seized, or the officer’s subjective intent 
to seize an individual? The text and the doctrine provide no neu-
tral basis for deciding these questions. Along this second dimen-
sion, the Court is wholly inconsistent, both within and across 
rights, as to whom the object is of the reasonableness standard. 
Sometimes we might think that the Constitution should protect 
reasonable expectations of citizens against government incur-
sions. We may expect government officials to do more than just 
a reasonable job of not violating our constitutional rights—and 
we may sometimes find government action reasonable, based on 
some fault by the citizen. Sometimes, judges assess the reasona-
bleness of group decisionmakers, asking whether legislation or 
administrative action is reasonable. Judges introduce still addi-
tional complications where reasonableness for the underlying 
constitutional standard of care blends with non-reasonableness-
based constitutional standards, or where reasonableness is used 
in a different sense to regulate remedies or standards of review 
for possible constitutional violations.  
A third problem exists: When a constitutional right is con-
cededly violated, should a remedy depend on a further determi-
nation of reasonableness in the eyes of federal judges, as opposed 
to reasonableness based on standards of care or validated facts 
proven to a jury? Often it does, and not necessarily due to statu-
tory rules, but rather because of court-made remedial limits im-
porting notions of reasonableness. Across this third dimension, 
judges engage in extensive stacking of different types of reason-
ableness inquiries. Reasonableness limits remedies or provides 
standards of review for judges asking whether constitutional 
rights were violated. Reasonableness can be used to deflect ques-
tions whether a right was violated onto another actor; if an offi-
cial or a judge acted reasonably, then no further inquiry need be 
conducted. For example, qualified immunity doctrine in consti-
tutional tort cases uses a reasonableness standard. 
Once all three dimensions are set out, one sees just how 
problematic constitutional reasonableness can be in operation. 
It provides no coherent direction to advise police officers that if 
they use deadly force, they must do so reasonably under the cir-
cumstances; but, if they do so unreasonably, the Fourth Amend-
ment violation may be deemed by a judge reasonable for quali-
fied immunity purposes. It provides no coherent direction to tell 
defense lawyers that unreasonable assistance may violate the 
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Sixth Amendment; but, so long as the state judge reasonably de-
nies relief, then there will be no remedy.17 In those examples and 
many others, constitutional reasonableness serves not just to 
permit constitutional balancing, but to blur lines between a 
rights deprivation and a defense or a remedial limitation on that 
right. Giving government actors discretion, if there is some 
boundary to it, is perfectly fine, but these stacked reasonable-
ness tests obscure the very notion of a right. Professor George 
Fletcher has argued in the criminal context, though the concern 
applies generally, that: “[t]he reasonable person enables us to 
blur the line between justification and excuse, between wrong-
fulness and blameworthiness, and thus renders impossible any 
ordering of the dimensions of liability.”18  
In Part II, I detail examples of constitutional reasonableness 
in constitutional criminal procedure, the First Amendment, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of these three areas, I de-
scribe how judges can blur the three dimensions set out in Part 
I, including by defining the standard with reference to individual 
or institutional actors and using the term to define rights, rem-
edies, and standards of review. That all of these varying inquir-
ies can be labeled as reasonableness inquiries itself leads to 
highly confusing rulings. One can read cases discussing whether, 
for example, a state judge was reasonable when deciding 
whether the attorney at a criminal trial reasonably decided to 
forfeit a defense regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy 
the defendant had in a police station, and whether doing so rea-
sonably affected the jurors—who were applying a beyond-a-rea-
sonable-doubt standard when deciding the question of guilt. 
Even if the concept of reasonableness can bear inconsistent us-
ages in the context of the same rights, far more clarity is needed 
to identify which are used and how.  
In Part III, I discuss how a range of prominent commenta-
tors have argued that the concept of reasonableness should be 
expanded in its use in constitutional interpretation. Some schol-
ars argue that originalist inquiry should begin by asking what 
reasonable persons at the time of the drafting of the Constitution 
would think; or what reasonable lawyers then would do; or, 
scholars argue, that reasonableness standards should be used in 
additional areas to conduct constitutional balancing. In contrast, 
 
 17. For discussion in the context of habeas corpus, see BRANDON L. GAR-
RETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND 
POST-CONVICTION LITIGATION 336 (2013). 
 18. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 962. 
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critics raise concerns that doctrines of reasonableness are a poor 
fit outside contexts like negligence, in which they refer to stand-
ards of care and permit jurors to reflect on what an ordinary per-
son might do. I argue that reasonableness has become overused 
precisely because it is susceptible to changing concepts, objects, 
and remedies. Judges can turn constitutional standards into 
very different animals, without changing the term of the stand-
ard. Judges can create exceptions and remedial restrictions that 
alternate from objective and subjective reasonableness, or use 
both.  
In Part IV, I argue that one unanticipated positive conse-
quence of the ubiquity of constitutional reasonableness stand-
ards is that judges could improve constitutional reasonableness 
by making the standards more defined and informed by empiri-
cal evidence. Judges could adopt wholesale what Professor An-
thony Amsterdam famously advanced, in the Fourth Amend-
ment context, as a regulatory model in which police discretion 
would be confined by written police practices and legislation 
within Fourth Amendment limits.19 Courts could interpret rea-
sonableness to require government officials to regulate on their 
own and by deferring to reasonable policies. Taking such a view 
requires looking beyond the reasonableness of the individual ac-
tors in a case and asking how the system works in the aggre-
gate.20 There has been a recent revival of academic interest in 
such approaches more broadly. Professor Seth Stoughton and I 
have argued for an approach, informed and encouraging best 
practices, in the Fourth Amendment use of force context.21 Pro-
fessor Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, as well as Pro-
fessor Christopher Slobogin, have recently argued that police 
should generally be incentivized to adopt regulations.22 The Su-
preme Court has adopted this approach in the context of chal-
lenges to prison rules that burden constitutional rights. Judges 
 
 19. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 409 (1974). 
 20. For an evaluation of potential aggregation in the criminal law context, 
see Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383 
(2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law].  
 21. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 6. 
 22. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1865 (2015) (arguing existing judicial review is “completely 
inadequate” to regulate law enforcement); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Ad-
ministration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 91 (2016) (arguing that when police agencies 
create “statute -like policies,” they must use notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
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ask whether they are “reasonably related to legitimate penolog-
ical interests,” although, as I will describe, that doctrine sug-
gests a cautionary tale about the willingness of judges to care-
fully review regulation.23 
Now that constitutional reasonableness has become so per-
vasive, a model in which judges assess reasonableness, as in-
formed by policy and practice, is more feasible across a broad 
range of constitutional doctrines.24 Such an approach encour-
ages the government to write informed regulations, curbing dis-
cretion.25 To be sure, constitutional law can demand difficult in-
terpretative choices in highly contested areas. Perhaps in some 
areas, regulation cannot be realistically agreed upon, and one 
would worry that self-interested actors would promote practices 
that suit their interests. The counter-argument is that, so long 
as reasonableness involves protections above a constitutional 
floor, those protections should be informed by more than judges’ 
own views of reasonableness. The aspiration of the approach—
while courts have not had much success in following it—is to do 
more than engage in blind judicial deference, and, rather, incen-
tivize informed regulation.  
At minimum, I hope to convince readers that existing rea-
sonableness doctrines are inconsistent and multifarious, so that 
they are often not even a clear enough form of deference. Even if 
constitutional tests can generally be inconsistent or complex, 
reasonableness raises its own unique problems as a referent 
across the different dimensions discussed. I hope to add more 
precision to the use of the term reasonable, but I also hope to call 
the inconsistent use of the term into question. The use of reason-
ableness should be confined to clearly defined dimensions. Still 
better, I argue we can aspire to a regulatory vision of reasonable 
and informed regulation. The judicial attraction, unfortunately, 
to the word reasonable may be precisely due to the ambiguity 
and malleability of its use across so many dimensions of consti-
tutional doctrine. It is no wonder a word so pervasively used in 
 
 23. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 24. It is a larger question whether drawing on administrative law is a use-
ful move in a range of areas. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward 
Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051 
(2016). To what degree courts should consider empirical research when devel-
oping rights is also a question beyond the scope of this piece. See, e.g., Lee Ep-
stein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone, Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (2015). 
 25. One important criticism of this approach, discussed further in Part IV, 
infra, is whether doing so defers to administrators at the expense of legislators. 
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modern private law, but appearing in just one portion of the 
Fourth Amendment, has come to define so much of American 
constitutional law. 
I.  THREE DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REASONABLENESS   
This Article discusses three dimensions of constitutional 
reasonableness standards. Each can characterize common law 
doctrine as well, but less frequently. Common law doctrines, say, 
of negligence, are often far less ornate than multi-part constitu-
tional tests. First, conceptions of reasonableness can be objec-
tive, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based—and some rights 
include mixed concepts, or more than one usage, side by side 
with another, in a compound standard. Second, the objects of 
reasonableness standards may be institutional or individual-
ized, and assessed from the perspective of judges, officials, legis-
lators, or citizens—or again, with compound standards that look 
to multiple perspectives in order to resolve a single rights claim. 
Third, the standard may apply to a right, or to assertion of de-
fenses, or waivers, or remedial limitations, or standards of re-
view. Or it could apply to potentially more than one type of 
standard of proof, or for relief on review, potentially blurring the 
distinctions between each of these. Thus, each dimension itself 
raises complex questions and has its own complex doctrine. This 
Part discusses each of the three dimensions in turn. 
A. CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 
The term reasonable itself has a range of uses and meanings 
in everyday language. We speak of reasonable explanations, or 
prices, or persons. Something that is reasonable is “not extreme 
or excessive”; it is moderate and fair, or it is inexpensive.26 A 
person who is reasonable has “sound judgment” or “the faculty 
of reason.”27 Quantities can be reasonable, people can be reason-
able, and interpersonal agreements can be reasonable. In the 
law, the term reasonable has that same range of uses, which 
track everyday language, but also additional uses that are dis-
 
 26. Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/reasonable (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). 
 27. Id. 
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tinctly legal. Reasonableness standards are pervasive in admin-
istrative law, civil procedure, contract law,28 corporate law,29 
criminal law,30 criminal procedure, employment discrimination 
law, tort law, and innumerable other fields.31 In each, reasona-
bleness can be used with conceptions that are, broadly speaking, 
objective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based. As Profes-
sor Frédéric G. Sourgens has aptly put it in an in-depth exami-
nation, there are “competing utilitarian, pragmatic, or formalist 
reasonableness paradigms.”32  
The reasonable person standard is best known from negli-
gence law, where courts have long used it to set an objective 
standard based on ordinary care in the relevant circumstances.33 
In tort law, the flexibility of the concept of reasonable care may 
be a weakness, but also its strength, giving courts the ability (in 
theory, at least) “to arrive at the correct judgment in a fact-de-
pendent context,” even if the concept is “frustratingly imprecise,” 
as Professor James Gibson puts it.34 The seemingly simple neg-
ligence standard can become quite complex in its different appli-
cations and permutations. The classic Judge Hand formula con-
ception of that standard of care adopts a calculus focused on 
social utility, based on a balance of the cost of a precaution, as 
 
 28. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (“A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a 
reasonable person to manifest his assent . . . .”). 
 29. Leo Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010). 
 30. Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 
passim (2011). 
 31. Judges developed reasonableness as “an objective, universally applica-
ble standard by which everyone’s actions could be measured.” CYNTHIA K. GIL-
LESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 98, 316 (1989). See also Stephen M. Feldman, 
Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 
BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 316 (2014) (“Then, from the 1820s to the 1850s, as tort law 
gradually separated from contract law, the concept of the reasonable or prudent 
man slowly emerged as a generalized standard of care or liability that would 
govern interactions among strangers.”). 
 32. Frédéric G. Sourgens, Right and Reasonableness: The Necessary Diver-
sity of the Common Law, 67 ME. L. REV. 74, 77 (2014). 
 33. Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998) (citing Lanni v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 88 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1952)) (“Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circum-
stances.”); Miller & Perry, supra note 3, at 325. 
 34. James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1641, 1643 (2008). 
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compared to the risk of injury and the size of the harm.35 How-
ever, courts do not always employ such a strictly economic cost-
benefit analysis. Instead, they often focus on what a reasonably 
careful person would do.36 Constitutional balancing does not ex-
plicitly adopt utilitarian formulas for assessing liability. Only in 
the procedural due process context, in the Mathews v. Eldridge 
test for assessing administrative procedures, has the Supreme 
Court adopted a utilitarian test for a constitutional right.37 In 
addition, comparative negligence takes into account the reason-
ableness of not just the tortfeasor, but also the victim.38 Negli-
gence per se standards can import bright-line rules from other 
contexts, in deference to legislative judgment, to define per se 
unreasonable actions—regardless of whether the legislation 
adopts a rule that reflects what a reasonable person might have 
otherwise done.39  
In the past, the negligence standard was a reasonable man 
standard. More recently, the reasonable man standard has been 
replaced by a reasonable person standard, which can reflect the 
perspective of those of “like age, intelligence, and experience un-
der like circumstances,” as the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
puts it.40 Standards of care may be adjusted to reflect different 
expectations for minors or the disabled, for example, and not 
based on a general utilitarian calculus. Whether courts or fact 
 
 35. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(expressing the Hand formula as B < PL, where B is the burden, P is the prob-
ability, and L is the injury). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2009). Even better, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965), puts it this way: “The prob-
lem involved may be expressed in homely terms by asking whether ‘the game is 
worth the candle.’” See also Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Effi-
ciency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (1997) (comparing the Hand for-
mula to the Golden Rule); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Val-
ues, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (2001) (“[T]he Reporter intended this defini-
tion to have the same meaning as a ‘reasonably careful person’ test. Moreover, 
the definition is meant to have some flexibility . . . .”). 
 37. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
 38. Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the 
Adoption of Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. c; see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2005). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A; accord David E. Seidel-
son, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The 
Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 17, 20 (1981). 
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finders effectively take account of those perspectives is another 
question. Common criticisms remain that reasonableness tends 
to be interpreted to reflect standards of care that do not reflect 
diverse viewpoints, but rather those of reductionist, or majority, 
or male viewpoints; a non-emotional perspective; or a privileged 
judicial perspective.41  
Moreover, in a range of areas, what is reasonable is defined 
based on industry standards of care, and not just by a cost-ben-
efit analysis. Thus, in medical malpractice cases, liability may 
depend on norms in the relevant medical community: for exam-
ple, the historical standard of care reflects “such reasonable care 
and skill . . . as is usually exercised by physicians or surgeons of 
good standing, of the same system or school of practice in the 
community in which he resides.”42 Those standards may not be 
sound ones; they may reflect consistent, but shoddy norms. The 
doctrine may even perversely disincentivize improvements upon 
standards of care. 
A negligence-based standard requiring reasonable care is 
used in a range of constitutional contexts. Rather than look to a 
person of “ordinary prudence,” perhaps informed by standards of 
care and accepted custom in a profession,43 constitutional tests 
may look to something more uncertain—government standards 
of care.44 In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, police 
 
 41. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable 
Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1404 
(1992) (“The male bias inherent in a standard that explicitly excludes consider-
ation of women as reasonable actors is obvious.”); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Plural-
ist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harass-
ment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1177–78 (1990) (“[J]udicial definitions of 
reasonableness often reflect the values and assumptions of a narrow elite . . . .”). 
 42. Hansen v. Pock, 187 P. 282, 284 (Mont. 1920), abrogated by Chapel v. 
Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 207 (Mont. 1990). For the current standard of care for 
board-certified specialists, see Chapel, 785 P.2d at 207 (“[W]hen a defendant in 
a medical negligence action [is] a board-certified specialist, his skill and learn-
ing [will] be measured by ‘the skill and learning possessed by other doctors in 
good standing, practicing in the same specialty and who hold the same national 
board certification.’” (quoting Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 826 (Mont. 
1985))). For the current standard of care for non-board-certified specialists, see 
Chapel, 785 P.2d at 210 (“[A] non-board-certified general practitioner is held to 
the standard of care of a ‘reasonably competent general practitioner acting in 
the same or similar community in the United States in the same or similar cir-
cumstances.’” (citing Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 349 A.2d 
245 (Md. 1975))). 
 43. E.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing 
the standard focusing on “accepted medical practice” in malpractice suits). 
 44. WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 32, 173–74 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
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officers are judged on whether they used reasonable force, based 
on an objective analysis of the circumstances.45 An officer is not 
treated as a reasonable civilian, but as a reasonable police officer 
in the circumstances—which raises the question whether one 
looks to police practices and norms in law enforcement to inform 
the reasonableness analysis.46 Other standards look at reasona-
ble representation by a criminal defense lawyer, or a reasonable 
legislator.47 In other contexts, as I will describe, the Supreme 
Court has examined reasonableness from the perspective of a 
criminal suspect,48 a juvenile,49 or an intellectually disabled per-
son.50 Such approaches track negligence law, where the reason-
able person may be replaced by the reasonable person of “like 
age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances,” as 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts puts it.51  
A reasonable person inquiry may also include subjective 
considerations. In Equal Protection Clause doctrine under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, while rational basis re-
view typically defers to reasonable legislative goals, if a statute 
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or animus, it may be 
found unconstitutional. Such a purpose-considering test is, at 
least in part, subjective, although the Court often frames it as 
unreasonable or irrational to be motivated by animus. Some 
Fourth Amendment decisions do not ask what a reasonable po-
lice officer would have done, but rather what a reasonable police 
officer would have done based specifically on the information the 
officer had under the circumstances, which some have termed a 
“subjective objectivity.”52 
Contract law does not adopt that utilitarian formulation of 
reasonableness; in contract law, a “rational basis ultimately is 
measured not by an absolute standard, but by reference to rele-
vant community standards.”53 Concepts of reasonable reliance, 
 
 45. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989). 
 46. For a larger discussion of that question, see Garrett & Stoughton, supra 
note 6, at 242–44. 
 47. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 50. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.  
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see 
also Seidelson, supra note 40. 
 52. Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reason-
able Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486 
(1994). 
 53. Sourgens, supra note 32, at 86. 
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based on relevant business practices, are designed to assure pre-
dictability—a central goal in contract law—and reflect a differ-
ent rationale than deference to medical practices used in a rele-
vant specialty or community of doctors designed to protect local 
professional norms. To be sure, some criticize the use of reason-
ableness to refer to outside standards of care. Professor John 
Gardner argues that reasonableness standards can obscure legal 
reasons and that the reasonable person “exists to allow the law 
to pass the buck, to help itself pro tempore to standards of justi-
fication that are not themselves set by the law.”54 That may be a 
relevant criticism for individualized uses of reasonableness 
standards in the common law, but not necessarily to either util-
itarian or formalistic uses of reasonableness to assess decisions 
by the government under constitutional standards that may as-
sess reasonableness given policy and other considerations. 
Reasonableness can also refer to an amount of some good, 
such as when reasonableness refers to a degree of certainty or of 
proof. In harmless-error-type review, a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty can refer to certainty that is not more probable than not, 
or meeting a preponderance of the evidence standard, but some-
thing more than just minimal certainty. The question asks 
whether it is reasonably probable that, absent the error, jurors 
would have had reasonable doubt concerning guilt.55 A reasona-
ble probability is perhaps twenty-five percent certainty, or some-
thing significant, but not reaching the level of more likely than 
not that jurors would have reached a different result at trial. 
Similarly, reasonableness can also refer to concepts of propor-
tionality. For example, in the area of civil detention, the Su-
preme Court asks whether an ongoing civil detention serves a 
“reasonable relation to the purpose” justifying the initial com-
mitment.56 The idea expresses a notion that additional detention 
must be proportional to the continuing justification for the de-
tention, and the use of reasonable reflects some modest, but not 
overly demanding degree of relation. 
 
 54. John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 LAW Q. 
REV. 563, 568 (2015). 
 55. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995); see also United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (adopting in the context of Brady v. Maryland 
claims a definition of materiality of “reasonable probability” as “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (adopting that formulation in the context of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims). 
 56. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 2017] CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 75 
 
Still more complex uses of reasonableness occur in the con-
text of constitutional standards that involve multi-factor balanc-
ing tests, discussed further in the Sections that follow. For ex-
ample, what does one make of the concept of reasonableness at 
work in a constitutional case like Kyllo v. United States, regard-
ing government use of thermal imaging technology on a person’s 
home?57 Fourth Amendment scholars have intensely debated 
how to conceptualize what reasonableness means in such a 
case.58 There, the Supreme Court discussed reasonable mini-
mum expectations of privacy, emphasizing the sanctity of the 
home,59 as balanced against government interests. The Court 
also considered other factors, such as whether technology is in 
“general public use” and available to the public,60 as well as some 
common law baseline level of personal privacy, “that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,” and should be un-
altered by new technology.61 This Fourth Amendment test looks 
more like constitutional balancing of individual and government 
interests, taking into account a range of factors, and is perhaps 
less focused on an individual person’s expectation of privacy than 
prior rulings. Calling this a reasonableness analysis makes 
sense, due to the Fourth Amendment text, but the analysis looks 
much like other constitutional balancing tests. In other Fourth 
Amendment rulings, the Court has long used, adopting Justice 
Harlan’s formulation in Katz, a test focusing on both the individ-
ual and society; asking whether the personal interest in privacy 
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”62 
Professor Sourgens terms this a formalist paradigm, in which 
judges decide what is reasonable given a balancing of relevant 
 
 57. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 58. See, e.g., Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 
126 YALE L.J. F. 8 (2016); Richard Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Par-
tial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013 
(2001); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 
72 MISS. L.J. 143, 148 n.13 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms 
and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Techno-
logical Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1425 n.146 (2002). 
 59. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 34 (describing rule adopted as one that “assures preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted”). 
 62. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting Harlan’s formulation from 
Katz). For a discussion of reasonable privacy interests, see also Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
476, 516–17 (2011). 
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interests, such as balancing law enforcement and personal pri-
vacy interests, or even, as in Kyllo, taking into account some 
common law baseline level of protection.63 It again is perhaps 
better thought of as reasonableness standing in for constitu-
tional balancing of the type performed in a range of constitu-
tional settings. Calling the balance between individual rights 
and social interests, as against law enforcement interests, a bal-
ance seeking a reasonable rule may be simply using the word 
reasonable to describe constitutional balancing. 
B. OBJECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 
A constitutional right can be violated by federal, state, and 
local actors, including (1) legislators enacting statutes; (2) exec-
utive officials enforcing them through actions and regulations; 
and (3) judges issuing judgments.64 A standard of constitutional 
reasonableness may refer to different government actors—and 
one purpose of these doctrines can be to assign responsibility for 
implementing constitutional rights to different actors. In com-
plex areas, like constitutional criminal procedure, where a wide 
range of different actors all work on investigations and trials, 
assigning such responsibility can be a challenging matter. More-
over, sometimes the constitutional standard views reasonable-
ness not from the perspective of the government actor, but rather 
from the perspective of the citizen whose rights were allegedly 
violated.  
The objects of constitutional reasonableness may be aggre-
gate and not individual. In some situations, the court looks at 
the question of reasonableness based on an institutional perspec-
tive, looking broadly to the interests of a government entity or 
actor. Or, the court may look systemically at what is reasonable 
regarding the effects of government action on citizens, in gen-
eral, and not the individual person bringing the case. As a result, 
some constitutional rights lend themselves to an aggregate or 
systemic inquiry, while other constitutional rights are more nar-
rowly individualized, or focused on case-specific circumstances.65 
The differences among these choices may reflect important 
differences in views concerning the goals of constitutional rights. 
 
 63. 533 U.S. at 34. 
 64. For a lucid discussion of the various objections of constitutional provi-
sions generally, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitu-
tion, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011). 
 65. Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 593 (2012). 
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If the main goal is to protect individual rights, then the perspec-
tive of an individual would be more important. If the main goal 
is to protect aggregate rights in society, then an aggregate, but 
citizen-focused perspective, may be appropriate. If the main goal 
is to balance individual versus government priorities, then per-
haps both perspectives are useful. If the main goal is to regulate 
or deter government, then perhaps the perspective of govern-
ment actors is the best perspective to adopt. None of this analy-
sis is to say that any one perspective is the best one for courts to 
adopt. 
However, these are choices that must be made, and typi-
cally, the constitutional text does not specify to which objects the 
right applies. Sometimes, it is not clear what the right answer is 
to the question of which actor should be regulated by the consti-
tutional right. The concept of reasonableness can then stand in 
for a set of decisions regarding who is regulated by the constitu-
tional right, and yet the term reasonableness does not itself say 
which perspective should matter.  
The Fourth Amendment, for example, states: “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”66 While it was understood to apply, before enactment 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation, only to federal 
officials, that does not resolve whether the reasonableness of the 
search should be assessed based on the perspective of the police 
officer, or the person being searched, or perhaps a judge deciding 
whether to authorize a search or to admit the evidence. As a re-
sult, some constitutional tests under the Fourth Amendment re-
fer to the reasonableness of a seizure, judged from the perspec-
tive of an objective police officer. Other tests assess 
reasonableness from a broader social perspective. The courts 
sometimes act as if reasonableness logically tells one who should 
be regulated. Since courts adopt very different reasonableness 
tests in the Fourth Amendment context, there must be some ex-
ternal feature of the purpose the right is serving that provides 
the answer to the question. 
Sometimes waivers of individual constitutional rights are 
assessed from the perspective of an individual. As the D.C. Cir-
cuit put it in the context of a criminal defendant’s guilty plea: 
[W]e do not think it is a sufficient reason . . . that appellants may in 
fact have labored under a subjective impression. . . . In our view, the 
 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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proper question . . . is . . . whether this belief was, in an objective sense, 
reasonable in the circumstances.67 
Yet what if the prosecutors withheld evidence or coerced the de-
fendant in some way; should a court ask whether a reasonable 
prosecutor would have engaged in those actions? Instead, the fo-
cus is on a reasonable defendant (and not on this defendant, ex-
cept to the extent that courts sometimes consider whether a vul-
nerable individual or juvenile would have been more likely to 
involuntarily plead guilty). Perhaps, for a question of waiver, the 
focus should be on the individual person, and not the govern-
ment. Doing so is a choice, and the choice of an objective stand-
ard, with just the defendant as the object, may absolve the gov-
ernment from constitutional responsibility.  
Perhaps one virtue of reasonableness is that it permits shift-
ing choices concerning from whose perspective the right is to be 
assessed. Calling it a reasonableness standard, however, does 
not answer the question to whom the standard applies. Thus, 
courts should have to do more work to justify the choice of a par-
ticular object of constitutional reasonableness.  
C. RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 
Reasonableness has migrated from standards for constitu-
tional rights to standards for assessing whether a constitutional 
violation deserves a remedy. Now, just as there is a choice to be 
made regarding from which perspective a right should be as-
sessed, there is nothing necessarily wrong with thinking sepa-
rately about how to define a right and how to define the condi-
tions under which a particular remedy may be appropriate. 
What has been surprising, however, has been the extent to which 
those distinctions have been blended. For example, the Supreme 
Court has said that the immunity of officials under § 1983 should 
be assessed under an objective reasonableness test.68 Such a 
standard had its origins in the Screws decision—in a rule of len-
ity defense against criminal liability—but this standard then mi-
grated to become a defense against civil liability, and a condition 
for obtaining relief for violations of constitutional rights more 
generally.69 The Court had earlier adopted a partially subjective 
 
 67. United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 1013 (1975). 
 68. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 69. An intent requirement, not a reasonableness requirement, applies in 
criminal actions concerning constitutional violations. In Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945), a plurality of the Court found 18 U.S.C. § 242, 
a statute making it a crime to “willfully” and “under color of any law” deprive a 
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test, but ultimately concluded that an objective test was prefer-
able. That objective reasonableness test then became the default 
standard for not only civil rights litigation under § 1983, but 
criminal prosecutions for violations of constitutional rights, 
harmless error review of constitutional errors during appeals, 
and post-conviction review of constitutional error using federal 
habeas corpus. Reasonableness now limits constitutional reme-
dies across the full spectrum of constitutional litigation.  
The standard governing liability under § 1983—the statute 
under which much of modern constitutional litigation is 
brought—is a reasonableness standard.70 Indeed, during the 
1980s, when the Court was moving Fourth Amendment use-of-
force law from a subjective to an objective standard, the Court 
made the same moves in its interpretation of § 1983. Initially, 
the Court adopted a mixed standard that was both subjective 
and objective, insulating officers from civil rights liability under 
a standard of qualified immunity.71 Section 1983 does not have 
any reasonableness requirement in its text.72 Yet the Court said 
that it would interpret the statute “in harmony with general 
principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in dero-
gation of them.”73 Where did it turn for a tort principle immun-
izing officials from constitutional tort liability? The doctrine of 
constitutional reasonableness, of course. The notion of reasona-
bleness was attractive to the Court not merely because it im-
poses sound standards of care but also because it is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, which judges can use at summary judgment 
to avoid a trial.74  
In 1982, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court rejected a sub-
jective approach in which officers would benefit from a subjective 
good-faith defense, in combination with an objective standard re-
quiring respect for constitutional rights, and changed course, 
adopting a two-part reasonableness standard.75 The Court held 
that officers are immune from suit so long as their conduct was 
 
person of their constitutional rights, required that the defendant intend to vio-
late a defendant’s constitutional rights. 
 70. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 71. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see also Gomez v. 
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 73. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). 
 74. Regarding judicial interest in rational remedies, see Aziz Z. Huq, Judi-
cial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 
1 (2015).  
 75. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
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(1) “objective[ly] reasonable[]”; and (2) “does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known.”76 No longer could plaintiffs al-
lege official “malice” and proceed to trial. In Harlow, the Court 
emphasized that “[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of 
an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly estab-
lished law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary 
judgment.”77 A subjective standard resulted in a factual inquiry, 
which many judges sensibly thought was inherently a jury ques-
tion. An objective reasonableness standard permitted more judi-
cial control over constitutional litigation, meaning fewer civil 
rights cases would go to trial. The Justices supplied additional 
reasons supporting the shift, including that a subjective inquiry 
permitted examination of the “subjective motivation” of officials, 
which may “entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of 
numerous persons,” which itself would be “peculiarly disruptive 
of effective government.”78  
The second prong of the standard resembles more of a neg-
ligence-type duty of care, but focuses on standards of care that 
come from federal judges. The Court has explained the notice-
related reasons for the shift to an objective standard concerning 
what constitutional law was clearly established by the federal 
courts at the time of the event: qualified immunity seeks to en-
sure that defendants “reasonably can anticipate when their con-
duct may give rise to liability.”79 Thus, the Court explained that 
for liability to accrue, “[t]he contours of the right [violated are] 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.”80 That places officers 
in the position of having to follow developments in the federal 
courts concerning constitutional law—these are not community 
standards of care or industry standards of care, but rather fed-
eral judicial standards, based on constitutional case law. 
Later the Court adopted this same civil reasonableness 
standard in the context for criminal prosecution for civil rights 
violations—in which there is a subjective, intent standard—
holding that whether the conduct violated clearly established 
constitutional law would be assessed under a reasonableness 
 
 76. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 817. 
 79. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984). 
 80. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
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standard.81 Reasonableness has spread farther into the law of 
constitutional remedies in criminal procedure. The concept of 
“objective reasonableness” was also adopted by the Supreme 
Court in additional Fourth Amendment decisions that limit ac-
cess to the exclusionary remedy at trial, based on a concept of 
reasonableness, apart from whether the search or seizure was 
itself reasonable.82 
The Supreme Court then adopted a reasonableness stand-
ard, modeled on the second part of the qualified immunity test, 
for all federal habeas litigation in Teague v. Lane, ruling that 
habeas litigants should not be able to assert new rights not in 
place at the time that the state judges denied them relief on their 
constitutional claims.83 The Court interpreted that standard as 
requiring deference to “reasonable, good-faith interpretations” of 
the law by state courts.84 Several Justices had argued that the 
standard should be that a federal court would ask whether “rea-
sonable jurists” would agree with the result reached by the state 
judges, including not just which law was to be applied, but 
whether the state judges reasonably applied the law to the facts 
of the case.85 Justice Clarence Thomas prominently, but unsuc-
cessfully, advocated for a “patently unreasonable” standard.86 
Once again, the attractiveness of a reasonableness standard was 
to empower federal judges to deny relief on a broader range of 
legal, as well as factual, questions. The Supreme Court never 
reached that question because Congress then incorporated a ver-
sion of such a standard, using language explicitly drawn from 
the qualified immunity context, when drafting the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996. AEDPA 
adopted a standard of review for all federal habeas corpus chal-
lenges that relief may only be awarded if the state judge denied 
 
 81. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). 
 82. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (“[S]earches conducted 
in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject 
to the exclusionary rule.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1983) 
(“[R]eliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . should be admissible in the 
prosecution’s case . . . .”). 
 83. 489 U.S. 288, 289 (1989). 
 84. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). 
 85. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1992). 
 86. Id. at 291 (“In other words, a federal habeas court ‘must defer to the 
state court’s decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently unrea-
sonable.’”). 
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relief in a manner that was an “unreasonable” application of 
“clearly established” Supreme Court law.87  
The use of reasonableness in that context raised novel ques-
tions because, while reasonableness has been used to describe a 
standard of care by persons, it was not an accepted standard of 
review. Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his opinion in Wil-
liams v. Taylor, the landmark decision interpreting the AEDPA 
standard, that this text “does not obviously prescribe a specific, 
recognizable standard of review,” using familiar terms such as 
“de novo” or “plain error.”88 Instead, Congress used the term rea-
sonableness. What does it mean to get the Constitution wrong, 
to erroneously deny relief to someone convicted due to a consti-
tutional violation, and do so in a wrong-but-reasonable way? 
Courts have struggled with that question ever since Congress 
adopted the statute. In Williams, the Court, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, rejected a somewhat circu-
lar formulation by the Fourth Circuit that a state judge could 
only get it sufficiently wrong if rejecting the constitutional claim 
“in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unrea-
sonable.”89 This, Justice O’Connor noted, risked turning the in-
quiry into a “subjective inquiry rather than . . . an objective one.” 
Indeed, some courts had said that since an appellate panel had 
split, then of course reasonable judges could disagree.90 Justice 
O’Connor noted that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt diffi-
cult to define.”91 However, “[t]hat said, it is a common term in 
the legal world, and accordingly, federal judges are familiar with 
its meaning.”92 It would mean that the state court must do more 
than decide federal law incorrectly, but rather unreasonably. 
The Court did not say more to explain what increment beyond 
being incorrect made a state court decision incorrect and also 
unreasonable. 
 
 87. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d). That provision states that a petition “shall not be granted,” if 
the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(2012).  
 88. 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000). 
 89. Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000). 
 90. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (citing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 
(5th Cir. 1996)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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Going still farther, the Court held in Fry v. Pliler that a fed-
eral court must also examine whether a state court’s determina-
tion that error was harmless was itself unreasonable.93 Yet Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, noted that the result 
of adding that reasonableness deference was no different than 
the Brecht harmless error test asking whether error reasonably 
contributed to the outcome.94 There was no need to further 
“stack” reasonableness deference on top of deference, and apply 
both tests (AEDPA deference and Brecht), when “the latter obvi-
ously subsumes the former.”95 
Constitutional reasonableness had come full circle. An ob-
jective reasonableness standard, designed perhaps initially with 
the Fourth Amendment and police use of force in mind, became 
the governing standard for all of § 1983 liability; it then mi-
grated into substantive criminal law interpretation; it was incor-
porated into underlying criminal procedure rights; and it was 
adopted by the Court in the habeas context—but then, in turn, 
adopted in the text of the federal habeas statute by Congress. 
Yet, the Supreme Court has kept hold of the reins. The 
Court has stealthily moved away in recent years from an objec-
tive reasonableness standard in federal habeas corpus, and in-
creasingly cited to what reasonable jurists might do, raising the 
specter of the very sort of subjective analysis that the Court 
soundly rejected as unworkable in Williams v. Taylor.96 In Har-
rington v. Richter, without having been briefed on the issue and 
without claiming to announce a new standard, the Court de-
scribed the AEDPA unreasonableness standard as one that re-
quired deference to state rulings “beyond any possibility for fair-
minded disagreement,” and asked whether “fairminded jurists 
could disagree.”97 The Court has added to the term “unreasona-
ble” a gloss regarding “fairminded jurists.”98 Still more rulings 
suggest that a court must examine the actual reasons provided 
by a court, and not hypothetical reasons (as in rational basis re-
view of legislation).99 The implication of these recent statements 
 
 93. 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 97. 562 U.S. 86, 101–03 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 
652, 664 (2004)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (per curiam). 
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is that jurists need not just be reasonable, and certainly not cor-
rect in their constitutional rulings, but just fairminded.100 The 
Justices encourage the lower federal judges to defer to their state 
court colleagues, with faint praise.101 
Constitutional reasonableness in criminal procedure goes 
still deeper into standards that control whether an inmate can 
obtain a remedy. The Supreme Court has said that constitu-
tional errors in criminal trials must be reviewed in federal ha-
beas corpus based on a constitutionally required harmless-error 
standard that asks whether the error reasonably affected the 
outcome at trial (or, conversely, lacked a “substantial and inju-
rious effect”).102 Of course, that review is layered over the under-
lying standard of proof at trial, at which a juror must apply a 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The layers of reasonable-
ness review run deep—it is reasonableness all the way down. 
II.  NAVIGATING CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 
DOCTRINE   
In this Part, I show in more detail how these three dimen-
sions can operate across a few key areas that illustrate well the 
complexity of constitutional reasonableness doctrines. First, I 
discuss rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause 
in particular. Second, I discuss constitutional criminal procedure 
rights, in which approaches differ sharply between certain Due 
Process Clause rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well 
as Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amend-
ment rights. 
 
 100. For criticism, see Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 519, 540 (2014) (“Richter not only made a striking change to habeas 
practice based on a statutory interpretation of a fifteen-year-old law that had 
been consistently interpreted otherwise by lower courts—it also did so sua 
sponte.”); Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive 
Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 220–21 (2013). 
 101. Huq, supra note 100, at 539 (“Habeas denial rates may be so high al-
ready that Richter ’s impact will be inframarginal. Nevertheless, there are early 
signs that at least lower court judges are heeding Richter ’s new verbal formu-
lation.”). 
 102. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (establishing separate federal habeas 
harmless-error standards limiting relief to where the constitutional error had a 
“substantial and injurious effect,” or when no “actual prejudice” resulted). The 
Court had previously defined “prejudice” as a “reasonable probability” that an 
error affected the outcome. See id.  
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A. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW 
For a broad range of constitutional rights, the Supreme 
Court uses the rational basis test, which is deferential to legis-
lative or executive action, absent some reason for heightened or 
strict scrutiny. The standard is not based on any particular con-
stitutional text.103 Instead, the test adopts a view of judicial re-
view and restraint, designed to defer to the broad range of goals 
of government action, rather than a standard designed to pro-
mote adherence to reasonable standards of care. Early cases em-
phasized whether legislation was supported by “reasonable 
grounds” and assessed state laws for their reasonableness in leg-
islating regarding the general welfare.104 Most infamous of those 
cases was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, sus-
taining a Louisiana law requiring race segregation in railway 
passenger cars as a reasonable exercise of the police power.105 
The standard has evolved into one of rational basis review, in 
which a range of constitutional rights receive deferential review, 
unless there is evidence that triggers stricter scrutiny of govern-
ment action. Such review is often considered to generally be 
toothless and “highly deferential.”106 
As Professor Richard Fallon explains: “As a doctrinal mat-
ter, the Court frequently treats reasonable disagreement as a 
ground for judicial deference to the political branches of govern-
ment.”107 The Court has often stated, in explaining such stand-
ards, that considering government motives and subjective intent 
is fraught. In United States v. O’Brien, for example, the Court 
noted that: “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes 
are a hazardous matter.”108 
Such rational basis review is commonly used to review equal 
protection challenges, but also challenges under the Due Process 
 
 103. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1627, 1630 (2016) (“There is no textual basis in the Constitution to jus-
tify reviewing legislation for its rationality.”). 
 104. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (stating that lawmakers had 
“reasonable grounds for believing that [their] determination is supported by the 
facts”). 
 105. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 106. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1689, 1713 (1984). 
 107. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Im-
plementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 (1997). 
 108. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 86 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:61 
 
Clause109 and other constitutional rights, such as First Amend-
ment claims directed at unprotected speech or conduct,110 and 
structural claims, such as Spending Clause claims examining 
the reasonable relationship between a condition and the ex-
penditure in federal spending legislation.111 
When conducting such review, “the theory of rational-basis 
review . . . does not require the State to place any evidence in the 
record.”112 Legislators need not “actually articulate at any time” 
the purpose of its classification.113 Instead, hypothetical bases 
for the legislation may suffice and the legislation “must be up-
held against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification.”114 This, as Professor Thomas Nachbar has re-
cently critiqued, consists of a highly deferential and not particu-
larly rigorous standard for rationality.115 Such review consists of 
an objective reasonableness test for legislators, taken collec-
tively, or for other government actors facing a discrimination 
 
 109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (applying rational basis 
review to anti-sodomy statute); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768 (1975) 
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)) (“Particularly when we 
deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare pro-
gram such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the Due Process Clause 
can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbi-
trary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.”). 
 110. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concur-
ring); e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973) (“It is not for 
us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the 
exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected 
by the Constitution itself.”). 
 111. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (“Congress conditioned 
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address this par-
ticular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended.”); Ivanhoe 
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (“[T]he Federal Govern-
ment may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal inter-
est in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”). 
 112. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). 
 113. Id. at 320 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)). 
 114. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1960) (“[L]egislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in 
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will 
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”). 
 115. See Nachbar, supra note 103. For additional criticism of the test, see 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 490 (2004) 
(stating that rational basis review’s “emphasis on deference at times leads 
courts to skip over the required step of evaluating the link between that per-
missible goal and the government’s action”); see also Neelum J. Wadhwani, 
Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802 (2006). 
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challenge, or other constitutional challenge where heightened 
scrutiny does not apply. Moreover, lawmakers may rely on “un-
provable assumptions” that “underlie much lawful state regula-
tion of commercial and business affairs.”116  
Like in other areas of reasonableness review, a seemingly 
“uncontroversial appeal of rationality” permits a broadly defer-
ential doctrine that nevertheless may change over time and per-
mit judicial intervention, without clear, binding rules.117 Thus, 
although it is nominally an objective analysis, the Supreme 
Court has had a long tradition of considering subjective motives, 
even when rational basis review might otherwise apply. In equal 
protection cases, the Supreme Court has said that a purpose to 
discriminate must be shown when strict scrutiny applies—“the 
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose.”118 The Court has also sometimes put it differently, as in 
Grutter, explaining that “[w]e apply strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool.”119 In that approach, the goal 
of strict scrutiny is to uncover whether the government used a 
discriminatory purpose. In contrast, while rational basis review 
is broadly deferential to the range of goals legislators may have 
sought, in some cases subjective motive matters. USDA v. 
Moreno emphasized that the “bare . . . desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest.”120 In Romer v. Evans, the Court found govern-
ment action impermissible even under rational basis review, if 
there is a showing of animus or discriminatory intent.121 Such 
cases, called by commentators as examples of “rational basis 
 
 116. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973). 
 117. Nachbar, supra note 103, at 1631. 
 118. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). For criticism, see, for 
example, David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 952 (1989). 
 119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Richmond v. J. 
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). 
 120. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (holding that a bare desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group is not a legitimate state interest). 
 121. E.g., 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (finding a Colorado Constitutional Amend-
ment “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
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with bite,”122 may reflect a bar on legislators expressing “naked 
preferences” for one interest group over another, as Professor 
Cass Sunstein has put it.123 In recent years, the Court has been 
tempted to engage in subjective analysis in another set of ra-
tional basis cases—cases that do not involve animus directed at 
any particular group, but rather single plaintiffs complaining of 
arbitrary treatment. In its “class of one” cases like Willowbrook 
v. Olech, the Court has held that the plaintiff may claim that he 
“has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”124 
In Lawrence v. Texas,125 United States v. Windsor,126 and 
most recently, Obergefell v. Hodges,127 the Court did not state 
whether its approach consisted of a rational basis review. Rather 
than using a reasonable legislator standard, the Court instead 
recognized a fundamental right and found that the Constitution 
“does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from mar-
riage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite 
sex.”128 The central focus in Lawrence and Windsor, in particu-
lar, was animus and discriminatory purpose; in Lawrence the 
 
 122. Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate 
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987); ERWIN CHEMERIN-
SKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 673 (3d ed. 2006) (“The 
claim is that in some cases where the Court says that it is using rational basis 
review, it is actually employing a test with more ‘bite’ than the customarily very 
deferential rational basis review.”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1972); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (“[A]pplications [of rational basis in Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer] depart from the usual deference associated with rational 
basis review. For this reason, commentators have correctly discerned a new ra-
tional basis with bite standard in such cases.”). 
 123. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1730. 
 124. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 
U.S. 591, 591–92 (2008) (holding that while a class-of-one equal protection claim 
can sometimes be sustained, the class-of-one theory does not apply in the public 
employment context). 
 125. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (concerning a Texas law prohibiting same-sex inti-
mate conduct). 
 126. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (concerning federal estate-tax treatment of a 
same-sex spouse). 
 127. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (concerning the right of same-sex couples to 
marry); see Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex 
Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 782 (2013). 
 128. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2591, 2607. The Court added that there is “no 
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage per-
formed in another State.” It was Justice O’Connor in a concurring opinion that 
invoked rational basis review: “When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a 
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Court emphasized that an anti-sodomy statute “furthers no le-
gitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”129 As a result, per-
haps, the dissenters in Obergefell did not argue that the appro-
priate standard of review should be rational basis review, nor 
that the motives of the legislators did not matter. Rather, they 
contested whether a right to same-sex marriage was appropri-
ately deeply rooted, or deserved recognition as a fundamental 
right, or whether the traditional understanding of marriage 
should govern.130 
Similarly, in the First Amendment area, despite the lan-
guage in O’Brien counseling against inquiries into motive, the 
Court sometimes applies the Lemon test, asking whether a stat-
ute has a “secular legislative purpose,” and whether it “neither 
advances nor inhibits religion” or fosters “excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”131 That well-known three-part test 
looks at the form and function of a statute, but also its purpose 
or intent.132 The Lemon test has never been overruled, but it is 
far from consistently applied; as Justice Antonin Scalia put it: 
“[W]hen we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it en-
tirely . . . . Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three 
prongs ‘no more than helpful signposts.’” He added that, like a 
“ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its 
grave and shuffles abroad,” the test persists; “Such a docile and 
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent 
state; one never knows when one might need him.”133 
Justice William Rehnquist once wrote in an opinion that 
“[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all . . . 
cases applied a uniform or consistent [rational basis] test under 
 
politically unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more searching form of ra-
tional basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection 
Clause.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Wind-
sor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Poin-
tillist Constructionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014). 
 130. 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 131. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (calling inquiry into “congressional motives or purposes 
. . . a hazardous matter.”). 
 132. For a case relying on the purpose prong, see, for example, Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 133. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 
741 (1973)). 
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equal protection principles.”134 Is the inconsistent use of an ob-
jective, as opposed to a subjective, rational basis test a symptom? 
Or just something to be expected in areas in which such reason-
ableness standards apply? The same can be said of intent tests 
more broadly: objective reasonableness standards may be hon-
ored as much in the breach as not, but they are useful tools to 
retain alongside subjective intent or purpose tests. They are use-
ful in the flexibility that they offer to judges, but they do not pro-
vide clear notice to government actors or the public. Perhaps 
more clarity would exist if the Court more clearly explained what 
types of actions are per se irrational, or adopted approaches de-
manding particular types of evidence of unreasonableness.135 
Just as tort law developed certain types of negligence per se, 
providing brighter-line examples of unreasonable behavior,136 
constitutional courts could provide further explanations of what 
types of conduct, or what types of information, support a conclu-
sion that government action is per se unreasonable or irrational 
under rational basis review. The language in Lawrence regard-
ing animus and identifying evidence concerning legislation that 
“furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual” can be 
seen as at least a step in that direction.137 
Another area in which reasonableness review is at least in-
formed by community practice and tested standards is in First 
Amendment public forum doctrine, in which “time, place, or 
manner” restrictions on speech may be reasonable if narrowly 
tailored and with “ample alternative channels” provided.138 The 
reasonableness of the time, place, or manner restrictions is as-
sessed based on “the nature of a place” and “the pattern of its 
normal activities,” and is therefore at least somewhat evidence-
based.139 What is practical, given prior practice; local govern-
ment; the community; and what alternative avenues for speech 
 
 134. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980). 
 135. Professor Nachbar describes early cases that adopted a view grounded 
in the police power, defining certain subjects for acceptable regulation. Nachbar, 
supra note 103, at Part I. Such substantive review is itself highly problematic, 
and Nachbar instead recommends requiring clear statement rules describing 
actual basis for legislation. Id. at 1689. 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 137. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 138. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 139. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
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remain open, can all be assessed.140 Perhaps for those reasons, 
the doctrine has been very little criticized.141 As I will develop 
more in Part III, concepts of reasonableness more closely an-
chored to industry practice, community norms, or empirical evi-
dence of effectiveness may prove far more defensible than stand-
ards developed solely by judges to reflect what judges think is 
reasonable. 
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REASONABLENESS 
In constitutional criminal procedure, whose perspective is 
adopted as that of the reasonable actor matters—that of a citi-
zen; of a criminal suspect; of a police officer; or a juror; or a de-
fense lawyer; or a judge? Each of these apply, and sometimes 
more than one of these perspectives matter. The differences typ-
ically relate to whether the focus is on individual rights or on 
deterrence of government actors. Sometimes both matter and 
both are kept in loose focus. Professor Kit Kinports points out 
how “the Court tends to shift opportunistically from case to case 
between subjective and objective standards and between whose 
point of view—the police officer’s or the defendant’s—it consid-
ers controlling.”142 The Due Process Clause regulates criminal 
trials, adopting the perspective of jurors when it demands that 
they be instructed to find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but 
at other times reflecting the perspective of defense lawyers and 
prosecutors that are being regulated. In Fourth Amendment rul-
ings, the focus is on police behavior and deterring overreaching 
searches and seizures, so the Supreme Court focuses on whether 
police action was reasonable, as well as on individual rights. In 
contrast, in some of its Fifth Amendment rulings, the Court fo-
cuses on the suspect as the relevant reasonable person—who 
may feel they are in police custody while being questioned, even 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Per-
mits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 937 
(1984) (describing the test as “possibly the most universally accepted tenet of 
first amendment doctrine”); see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Gener-
ally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utter-
ances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2005). 
 142. For an important discussion of this general problem in criminal proce-
dure, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 74 (2007). 
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if not formally under arrest.143 Sixth Amendment (and due pro-
cess) ineffective assistance of counsel rulings focus on two dis-
tinct forms of reasonableness: that of a reasonable lawyer, based 
on professional standards, and that of reasonable jurors and 
whether the outcome at trial might have been prejudiced.144 
That standard creates the possibility of “doubly deferential” re-
view, with not just the two forms of reasonableness used to de-
cide whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel, but also 
whether relief is warranted, based on the AEDPA standard of 
review limiting relief unless the state judge was unreasonable in 
dismissing the Sixth Amendment claim.145 Reasonableness is 
piled on top of reasonableness like a layer cake—and this Section 
explores how constitutional criminal procedure has become shot 
through with varying and inconsistent reasonableness inquiries. 
They have a common purpose—to limit remedies for a wide 
range of constitutional rights—as well as to assign responsibility 
to a range of different criminal justice actors. 
These differing tests can reflect difficult choices regarding 
the purpose of constitutional criminal procedure: Is the goal to 
protect individual rights, deter and regulate government actors, 
or both? Those shifting and sometimes inconsistent priorities in 
constitutional criminal procedure writ large then become instan-
tiated through reasonableness tests. 
1. Due Process Clause 
In criminal procedure rulings concerning the due process 
clause, fair trial rights do not primarily take the perspective of 
the individual guaranteed the right to a fair trial, but rather a 
series of actors being regulated by the due process right in ques-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that a jury must be instructed 
that it may only find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, 
when the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed, the evidence is 
assessed from the prosecutor’s perspective, giving the prosecu-
tion the benefit of all inferences in favor of their evidence.146 Dur-
ing federal habeas corpus, a miscarriage-of-justice standard that 
 
 143. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (holding that “custody 
must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation 
would perceive his circumstances,” but a suspect’s age or experience is not rele-
vant to the analysis). 
 144. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 145. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013). 
 146. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant ques-
tion is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
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can excuse procedural bars applies, and it adopts a preponder-
ance standard directed at federal judges, asking whether “it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”147 The federal 
judge must make “a probabilistic determination about what rea-
sonable, properly instructed jurors would do,” looking at not just 
the evidence at the original criminal trial but also newly discov-
ered evidence, all viewed “holistically” together.148 In dissent in 
House v. Bell, Chief Justice John Roberts would have reformu-
lated the standard and denied relief, so long as “at least one ju-
ror, acting reasonably, would vote to convict.”149 To be sure, some 
due process rules in criminal procedure do not take account of a 
government perspective. For example, when considering a denial 
of defendant’s counsel of choice, or of a public trial, a court does 
not ask whether the violation was reasonable from either the 
government or defendant’s perspective, but rather treats the vi-
olation as a per se structural error.150 Most due process rules, 
though, use reasonableness designed to accomplish regulatory 
goals, with less focus on the individual. 
2. Fourth Amendment 
As noted, in a range of rulings, the Court has long used a 
broad test, focusing on balancing both the individual privacy in-
terest and the larger interest of society against law enforcement 
interests, asking whether the personal interest in privacy is “one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”151 Such a 
test is objective, but focused on the individual, law enforcement, 
and society. Other Fourth Amendment rules select different con-
cepts of reasonableness and different objects. In the use of force 
context, the Court held in Graham v. Connor that the inquiry is 
an objective-reasonableness standard, focused on the perspec-
tive of the police officer, not that of the citizen.152 While the 
 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 147. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 
 148. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 
329). 
 149. Id. at 572 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 150. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). 
 151. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting Harlan’s formu-
lation from Katz); for discussion, see Kerr, supra note 62, at 516–17. 
 152. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[S]ubjective motivations 
of the individual officers . . . [have] no bearing on whether a particular seizure 
is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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standard is ostensibly objective, it is limited to some degree to 
the time period when force was used, and based on the infor-
mation available to the officer, with the Court emphasizing that 
the “calculus of reasonableness” should “embody allowance for 
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments[] in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rap-
idly evolving.”153  
In other respects, the Court has highlighted that an officer 
must, for example, face an “immediate threat” to their safety, 
but that much-quoted formulation does not reflect what a rea-
sonable officer would do, based on training and best practices. 
More recent rulings, such as Scott v. Harris,154 Brosseau v. 
Haugen,155 and Mullenix v. Luna,156 fail to discuss or reject the 
relevance of sound police policy and training, instead highlight-
ing how the result “depends very much on the facts of each 
case.”157 As Seth Stoughton and I have described elsewhere, the 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment incorrectly con-
strains the use of police tactics to inform the reasonableness in-
quiry.158 Instead, the focus should be taken from the individual 
officer, and placed, at the department level, on sound policy and 
training.159 State tort law takes a different approach, focusing 
on general standards of care. Rules limiting liability for assault 
do not define reasonableness based on any particular moment in 
time; the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts a rule of neces-
sity, such that deadly force can only be used “when it reasonably 
appears” to the officer “that there is no other alternative” means 
available, short of abandoning the arrest.160 
Indeed, in other Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court 
adopts a standard of care attempting to reflect sound policy and 
 
 153. Id. at 396–97. 
 154. 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an 
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the 
end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonable-
ness.’”). 
 155. 543 U.S. 194 (2004). 
 156. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198) (holding a rea-
sonableness inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the 
case, not as a broad general proposition”). 
 157. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201. 
 158. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 6. 
 159. The structure of § 1983 doctrine, as well as the interpretation of the 
reasonableness of force, results in the focus on individual officers and not policy 
and training, as described in Garrett & Stroughton, supra note 6, Part I.A. 
 160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 cmt. F (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(noting that deadly force “is privileged only as a last resort”). 
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training. In United States v. Leon, the Court posed the question 
whether a “reasonably well trained police officer could have be-
lieved that there existed probable cause to search [defendant’s] 
house.”161 To provide impetus, the Court cited to Professor Jerold 
Israel’s discussion of the goals of such constitutional standards 
of care: to “make officers aware of the limits imposed by the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment and emphasize the need to operate 
within those limits.”162 
In still other contexts, it is the objective perspective of the 
individual defendant that is important. A person is seized if a 
reasonable person would not feel “free to leave.”163 A person’s 
reasonable “expectation of privacy” matters.164 Yet, according to 
the Court, whether a person is seized also depends on the sub-
jective intent of the officer, since an accidental police action is 
not a seizure.165 The Court also adopts a (partially) subjective 
test for consent and waiver of rights, where the voluntariness of 
a waiver is assessed based on factors including the “possibly vul-
nerable subjective state of the person who consents,” such as 
whether the person is disabled.166 If the officer misperceives 
whether the person consented to a search, however, then the test 
is objective, from the perspective of the officer, making both ob-
jective and subjective consent of the citizen largely irrelevant.167 
 
 161. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).  
 162. Id. at 919 n.20 (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the 
Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412–
13 (1977)). 
 163. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 502 (1983); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The stand-
ard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment 
is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”). 
 164. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 165. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (“[A] Fourth 
Amendment seizure . . . [occurs] only when there is a governmental termination 
of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”). 
 166. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229, 248 (1973); see also 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (holding that the re-
spondent’s age, educational attainment, gender, and ethnicity were relevant but 
not decisive in finding that she voluntarily consented to accompany officers to 
the DEA office). 
 167. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding a warrantless 
entry is valid based upon consent from someone whom the police reasonably, 
though mistakenly, believe possesses common authority over the premises); 
Bruce A. Green, “Power, Not Reason”: Justice Marshall’s Valedictory and the 
Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 383 
(1992) (discussing how Jimeno equated “reasonableness” of a consensual search 
 96 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:61 
 
The objective perspective of the officer trumps all other consid-
erations.  
One gets the impression that the Court picks and chooses 
concepts of reasonableness—subjective or objective (dimension 
one) and the individual or systematic perspective from which it 
is assessed (dimension two)—in order to micro-calibrate Fourth 
Amendment coverage, to make it very difficult for individuals to 
know whether a search or seizure is unreasonable or to litigate 
the question, and to maximize the discretion of police officers. 
Still other Fourth Amendment tests steer back and forth 
from the objective and the subjective. The standard for police use 
of force is defined as an objective test, focusing on the perspective 
of a reasonable police officer. Yet the Court also asks what a rea-
sonable officer would have done based on the information that 
this particular officer had under the circumstances, a somewhat 
subjective objectivity, since a reasonable professional may have 
acted quite differently under the circumstances.168  
While the main thrust of its rulings in the past two decades 
has been to move towards more objective reasonableness tests, 
recently the Supreme Court has uncharacteristically slipped 
back into partially subjective Fourth Amendment tests; recog-
nizing, for example, a good-faith exception for a police officer’s 
reasonable reliance on a warrant (even if issued erroneously).169 
That standard takes into account individual decisions of the po-
lice officer, even if they would not be reasonable, absent the good-
faith errors.170 Whether a police officer has probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion is similarly viewed from the perspective of 
a reasonable police officer.171 In that context, however, the Court 
has slid towards the subjective, stating that the experience of 
 
to the “reasonableness” of the police officer ’s perspective in believing that the 
suspect consented). 
 168. Alpert & Smith, supra note 52. 
 169. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 170. See id. at 923. 
 171. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002) (stating that an officer 
is “entitled to make an assessment of the situation in light of his specialized 
training and familiarity with the customs of the area’s inhabitants”); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws inferences 
and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person, . . . [and] 
. . . the evidence . . . must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis 
by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”). 
But see Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (rejecting as “arbitrar[ ]y” 
the argument that “[a]n arrest made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would 
be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances 
would not”). 
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officers may be relevant in some cases.172 Whether evidence 
seized by police has an independent source, such that the fruits-
of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply, may depend on the 
subjective motivations of the officers, based on intent and the 
“purpose and flagrancy” of the conduct.173 In contrast to such 
uses of subjective reasonableness, where the subjective intent of 
the officer might show pretext or malicious action, the Court has 
rejected any rule that would “attempt to root out subjective vices 
through objective means.”174 As the Court put it in Whren, en-
capsulating the complex view of reasonableness at work in the 
area, “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind 
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action 
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
that action.”175 What does that even mean? It means that sub-
jectively disturbing police action, such as intentionally unconsti-
tutional actions, are excused so long as the hypothetical reason-
able officer would have acted similarly. Objective reasonableness 
preserves deference. 
The second dimension comes into play in other Fourth 
Amendment rulings. Shifting the objects for administrative 
searches from officers to entire police departments, in an effort 
to defer to police department policies, the Court asks whether 
“programmatic purpose” and “special needs” justify a search, 
even if it was not justified based on reasonable and individual-
ized suspicion.176 In contrast, a stop and frisk under Terry v. 
Ohio may be made without probable cause, based on an individ-
ual officer’s “reasonable suspicion.”177 And, as discussed, that an 
officer uses deadly force in a manner that violates department 
policy or a “programmatic purpose” may not matter at all, so far 
as the officer’s actions under the specific circumstances were 
reasonable. 
For a wonderful send-up of the contradictions in what I have 
called the first and second dimensions of the reasonableness 
 
 172. Peter B. Rutledge, Miranda and Reasonableness, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1011, 1017 (2005) (arguing that the Court engages in “subjective inquiry” when 
examining “a particular officer ’s experiences” while using an “objective inquiry” 
when examining a suspect’s actions during Fourth Amendment seizures). 
 173. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). 
 174. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). 
 175. Id. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
 176. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006). 
 177. 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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problem, Professor Ronald J. Bacigal provides this list of con-
trary conceptions and viewpoints in conducting a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis of an encounter during which a police officer stops 
a person and proceeds to question them; in that situation, the 
Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment doctrine takes into considera-
tion: 
1. A reasonable person’s perception of the officer ’s initial approach. 
2. The suspect’s actual response to the officer ’s approach. 
3. The officer ’s intent to seize the person through means intentionally 
applied. 
4. The suspect’s subjective intent to consent to a search of his wallet. 
5. A reasonable officer ’s perception of the scope of the consensual 
search. 
6. A reasonable person’s perception of whether he was in police custody. 
7. The suspect’s subjective knowledge that he was addressing a police 
officer. 
8. A reasonable officer ’s perception of whether his comment was likely 
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 
9. Any unusual susceptibility of the particular defendant to covert per-
suasion. 
10. The officer ’s actual knowledge of the suspect’s unusual susceptibil-
ity. 
11. The suspect’s subjective ability to make a free and voluntary state-
ment. 
12. An objective assessment of whether the suspect waived his Mi-
randa rights.178 
Professor Bacigal deplores these inconsistencies and summa-
rizes: “At Center Court Wimbledon it is entertaining to watch 
the ball shift back and forth between the opponents.”179 Consti-
tutional criminal procedure is complex in part because it at-
tempts to regulate very difficult subject matter. But, 
[i]t is less captivating to observe constitutional analysis in which the 
United States Supreme Court appears to hide the ball, or at least 
makes it difficult to appreciate the nature of the game being played, as 
it shifts between objective and subjective perspectives of citizens, police 
officers, and hypothesized reasonable people.180 
Unfortunately, the problem of the Fourth Amendment is 
still more complex when one introduces the third dimension, re-
garding remedies: that of exclusion at a criminal trial and qual-
ified immunity as applied to civil damages remedies. Still other 
Fourth Amendment decisions limit access to the exclusionary 
 
 178. Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 681–82 (1998). 
 179. Id. at 677. 
 180. Id. 
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remedy at trial, based on a concept of reasonableness different 
from a question whether the search or seizure itself was reason-
able, focusing instead on whether an officer reasonably relied on 
overruled-but-then-established prior precedent or on an errone-
ous warrant.181 Here again we see elaborate stacking of different 
reasonableness inquiries. Thus, due to the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, a court may ask at the summary judgment stage 
whether a (1) reasonable jury could conclude that the police of-
ficer conducted an (2) unreasonable search or seizure or even, if 
so, whether the officer acted objectively (3) reasonably given the 
circumstances, and in (4) reasonable reliance on clearly estab-
lished law. Reasonableness on top of reasonableness character-
izes the entire project of litigating constitutional torts, but each 
usage refers to different forms of reasonableness, including the 
perspectives of jurors, officers, and those based on case law by 
federal judges. 
As Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau put it, “It is 
now possible to speak of that famous conundrum of reasonable 
unreasonable searches—those searches that are sufficiently un-
reasonable that they deprive the defendant of his Fourth 
Amendment right, but not so unreasonable that any remedy will 
be forthcoming.”182 Moreover, substantive Fourth Amendment 
law itself reflects interpretations of reasonableness designed to 
prevent undue exclusionary or damages remedies, and yet now 
separate doctrines accomplish that goal along the remedial di-
mension. Thus, “current Fourth Amendment law is the worst of 
both worlds—it produces a substantive Fourth Amendment cor-
rupted by the fear of a mandatory exclusionary rule that no 
longer exists.”183  
The much-lamented confusion in Fourth Amendment doc-
trine can be seen as a product of shifting choices made across 
each of the three dimensions of constitutional reasonableness 
doctrines: (1) concepts of reasonableness that are objective, sub-
jective, or all-things-considered balancing; (2) objects of reason-
 
 181. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011) (holding 
that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate 
precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule”); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (holding that “reliable physical evidence seized by officers 
reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magis-
trate . . . should be admissible in the prosecution’s case”). 
 182. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 591 (2014). 
 183. Id. at 592. 
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ableness that vary between a police officer’s perspective, the cit-
izen’s perspective, a combination of both, as well as that of soci-
ety, and a police department; and (3) use of reasonableness to 
craft exceptions and limits to exclusionary and damages reme-
dies.  
Scholars have made Herculean efforts to try to synthesize 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet still additional portions of the 
Fourth Amendment, such as the separate-warrant requirement, 
do not relate to the unreasonable-search-and-seizure require-
ment. Reconciling the use of reasonableness in the search and 
seizure context, with tests that do not pertain to reasonableness, 
raises still more complications. Some, like Professor Akhil Amar, 
have hoped that the concept of reasonableness can do heavy lift-
ing in that work, extending to govern and unify Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine generally.184 However, these shifting dimensions 
suggest that unity cannot be found unless the concepts, objects, 
and usages of reasonableness are all worked out through the doc-
trine, which would require still more Herculean efforts by schol-
ars and agreement by judges and Justices. If reasonableness is 
going to do such heavy lifting across so many aspects of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, then the careful parsing of concepts, ob-
jects, and usages of reasonableness must be carefully set out and 
justified. Whether all of the current arrangements can be justi-
fied is equivocal. 
3. Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment reflects similar variety in the usages 
of reasonableness. The famous Miranda warnings need only be 
provided to a person in custody, but whether a person is deemed 
to be in custody depends on whether a person would reasonably 
feel free to leave.185 The Court has suggested this is a purely ob-
jective determination: “[T]he initial determination of custody de-
pends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on 
the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers 
 
 184. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 759 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment generally “require[s] 
that all searches and seizures be reasonable”). 
 185. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (“[W]ould a reasonable 
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave.”); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring proce-
dural safeguards when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way”). 
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or the person being questioned.”186 The Court noted that the rea-
sonable person standard was imported from the negligence 
standard in torts, where it would be a jury determination, while, 
in the Fifth Amendment context, it is considered a question of 
law for a judge to decide.187 
However, in its voluntariness case law concerning due pro-
cess and Fifth Amendment protections against coercive police in-
terrogations, the Supreme Court has examined subjective, as 
well as objective, circumstances, sometimes focusing on the de-
fendant as the proper object of inquiry and sometimes on the po-
lice officer. In decisions such as J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the 
Court noted that the circumstances can include individual char-
acteristics of the person, such as juvenile status, and thus one 
should consider whether a reasonable juvenile—rather than a 
reasonable adult—would feel free to leave.188 The Court ex-
plained: “[S]o long as the child’s age was known to the officer at 
the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively ap-
parent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analy-
sis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.”189 The 
Court insisted it was adhering to an objective test, but it consid-
ered both the perspective of the officer and what the officer knew 
(or reasonably should have known) about the vulnerability of the 
individual defendant.190 How to reconcile that ruling with the 
Court’s ruling that age and experience with law enforcement 
were not relevant circumstances to the custody inquiry in Yar-
borough v. Alvarado is hard to say.191 A reasonable person stand-
ard can admit consideration of relevant personal characteristics, 
and for juveniles, the Court considers those that might make the 
defendant perceive custody differently.192 In Colorado v. Con-
nelly, the Court rejected a claim by a grossly mentally ill person 
who was easily coerced and led by the police.193 The Court held 
that, even if unreliable, a confession is not involuntary if it is not 
 
 186. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1994) (per curiam) (stat-
ing that custody depends on “how a reasonable person in the position of the 
individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of 
action’” (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984))). 
 187. Keohane, 516 U.S. at 113 n.13. 
 188. 564 U.S. 261, 275–76 (2011). 
 189. Id. at 277. 
 190. Id. at 272. 
 191. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–69 (2004) (explaining 
why age and experience with law enforcement are not objective circumstances). 
 192. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275. 
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the result of “coercive police conduct” and if the officer did not 
engage in “wrongful acts” to affirmatively take advantage of the 
defendant’s mental state.194 In contrast, in Arizona v. Ful-
minante, the Court emphasized the defendant’s subjective “fear 
of physical violence” from a prisoner who was a government co-
operator.195 As Professor Kit Kinports has detailed, the Court 
has not clearly explained how to resolve these cases and whether 
it is solely the officer’s perspective that matters.196 
In Yarborough, a different reasonableness inquiry limited 
the remedy: the Justices concluded that, under AEDPA, reason-
able jurists could disagree about the state of the law such that 
the state judge did not make an “unreasonable determination” of 
constitutional law in rejecting the Fifth Amendment claim, and 
therefore, habeas relief was not warranted.197 Separately, in 
cases not about custody but about the voluntariness of a suspect 
during police interrogations, the Court has stated that age and 
the characteristics of a person are relevant to voluntariness but 
that it is explicitly a totality-of-the-circumstances test, asking 
whether a person’s will was overborne by police questioning and 
not a test that focuses on a concept of reasonableness.198 
In still other rulings, the Supreme Court has created subjec-
tive good-faith exceptions to its ostensibly objective test asking 
whether the officers “reasonably conveyed” the Miranda warn-
ings, stating that even if a “reasonable person in the suspect’s 
shoes” would not have understood that they had a choice 
whether to continue to talk to the police or not, “a good-faith Mi-
randa mistake” can excuse the failure to provide the warn-
ings.199 The Court shifted from an objective-officer perspective to 
an objective-suspect perspective and ultimately recognized a 
subjective-officer exception. No wonder Professor Kinports has 
carefully criticized the utter “confusion surrounding the control-
ling viewpoint in Miranda cases,” as well as whether “reasona-
bleness” is objective or subjective.200 
 
 194. Id. at 163–65. 
 195. 499 U.S. 279, 279, 287–88 (1991). 
 196. Kinports, supra note 3, at 121–22 (“In the end, the cases, and the diver-
gent perspectives on which they turn, cannot be reconciled.”). 
 197. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).  
 198. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 284 (2011) (citing Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). 
 199. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 200. Kinports, supra note 3, at 103. 
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4. Sixth Amendment 
A jury must find guilt in a criminal case using a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard. That standard is objective when as-
sessed on appeal or post-conviction. One might expect Sixth 
Amendment right-to-a-jury-trial rulings to chiefly focus on the 
perspective of jurors, but that is not the case. In striking down 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. 
Booker, the Supreme Court found that the Guidelines took fact-
finding away from jurors.201 The remedy, though, included the 
ability of appellate judges to approve a sentence as reasonable, 
given a guideline’s range and statutory factors, among other con-
siderations.202 The standard is one of judicial reasonableness, 
not juror reasonableness.203 In other contexts, the standard is 
not a reasonableness standard at all: if a suspect requests coun-
sel during an interrogation, for example, then that choice must 
be strictly respected, whether it was reasonable or not.204 Then 
again, if the person waives the right to request counsel, the 
standard is subjective, asking whether the defendant “intention-
ally” abandoned or relinquished the “known right.”205 
The use of reasonableness becomes still more ornate in the 
context of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Sixth Amend-
ment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rulings focus on two dis-
tinct forms of reasonableness. First, a court asks whether a rea-
sonable lawyer, based on professional standards, provided 
objectively unreasonable representation to the client.206 Second, 
the court asks whether that deficient representation prejudiced 
the outcome, based on what reasonable jurors would have other-
wise done.207  
That standard creates the possibility of stacked reasonable-
ness review with not just the two forms of reasonableness used 
to decide whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel but 
also whether relief is warranted, based on the AEDPA standard 
of review limiting relief unless the state judge was unreasonable 
in dismissing the Sixth Amendment claim.208 The Supreme 
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Court has repeatedly called this review “doubly deferential.”209 
But, in fact, that is an understatement. There can be so many 
different types of reasonableness elements to the consideration 
of such a claim during federal habeas corpus review that the 
stacking of these reasonableness inquiries becomes so ornate 
and duplicative that judges may simply not bother to conduct 
much of the inquiry. So, a federal judge might ask if the state 
court actually went through all of the Supreme-Court-prescribed 
motions: whether the state judge was (1) unreasonable when de-
ciding whether the trial lawyer was (2) unreasonable in provid-
ing representation, and whether (3) reasonable jurors would 
have found guilt beyond a (4) reasonable doubt, affecting the out-
come at trial to a (5) reasonable degree such that there was prej-
udice. Added to that, a federal judge may consider whether the 
state judge’s determination that any deficient performance by 
counsel lacked prejudice was itself (6) unreasonable. While this 
may sound byzantine, it is not unusual; ineffective assistance of 
counsel is the most commonly litigated federal habeas corpus 
claim.210 The Supreme Court has often said that a judge need 
only discuss the portions of the analysis necessary to resolve the 
issue.211 In effect, a judge can pick and choose which reasonable-
ness doctrine can most readily dismiss a constitutional claim. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS WRIT LARGE   
Some scholars have argued that reasonableness should do 
even more work in animating constitutional interpretation, 
while others criticize particular usages of constitutional reason-
ableness. Still others view reasonableness as imprecise, but a 
second-best solution where it is difficult to define constitutional 
standards that must apply in a broad range of circumstances. 
The thrust of the prior Parts, of course, has been that reasona-
bleness is an overworked concept that stands for too many ideas 
and functions. To be sure, the challenges that courts face in 
adopting constitutional standards cannot be underestimated. 
This Part and the next will turn to those challenges. Most re-
cently, scholars have advanced greater use of reasonableness 
standards to explain originalist interpretation and constitu-
tional balancing more generally. It should be no surprise that a 
 
 209. Id. at 13; Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011). 
 210. See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (describing ineffective assistance of counsel 
as a “common claim”). 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 18 n.3 (declining to discuss prejudice after finding that 
trial representation was not ineffective). 
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jack-of-all-trades concept would be invoked to support new theo-
ries of constitutional interpretation. I, however, argue that based 
on the evidence discussed in this Article, the critics of the over-
use of constitutional reasonableness are correct that reasonable-
ness doctrines risk manipulation—and in more ways than had 
been understood and along entirely separate dimensions of con-
stitutional interpretation. The burden should be on an advocate 
of the use of a reasonableness test to show why it improves on 
alternatives, and in Part IV, I will describe what is, in my view, 
a preferable approach towards constitutional reasonableness. 
A. REASONABLE PERSON ORIGINALISM 
Originalism has an indeterminacy problem—assessing 
what the Framers and ratifiers would have thought about a 
given constitutional problem—and it should be no surprise that 
the reasonable person should be asked to assist. As Professors 
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman describe, a range of originalist 
scholars have in their writing “endorsed reliance upon the rea-
sonable person in constitutional interpretation.”212 In the view 
of scholars advancing this notion of originalism, the perspective 
of an ordinary speaker—a reasonable perspective—determines 
the meaning of the Constitution. Professors John O. McGinnis 
and Michael B. Rappaport argue, “the focus of originalism,” in 
constitutional interpretation, “should be on how a reasonable 
person at the time of the Constitution’s adoption would have un-
derst[ood] its words and thought they should be interpreted.”213 
This is a reasonable person as of 1788, presumably among that 
limited group of males that had the franchise (or perhaps it 
should be limited to those who participated in framing or ratifi-
cation decisions). Such details are irrelevant to the theory, which 
focuses not on the subjective intent of the Framers, even taken 
collectively, but rather on the reasonable meaning of the text 
based on ordinary usage at the time.214 Thus, Professor Law-
rence Solum asks: “How would an ordinary American citizen flu-
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ent in English as spoken in the late eighteenth century have un-
derstood the words and phrases that make up its clauses?”215 
The perspective of an ordinary, or reasonable, speaker addresses 
the problem of trying to assess subjective motivations or intent. 
Whether it is possible to compile sufficient evidence to ascertain 
what an ordinary speaker would have thought, or whether con-
stitutional text was designed to reflect a reasonable person’s 
speech rather than legal terminology, raises a different set of 
challenges. In addition, others argue that the concept of looking 
to a reasonable speaker at the time is itself anachronistic. For 
example, Professor Stephen Feldman has argued that there was 
no pervasive usage in the common law at that time of the concept 
of a reasonable person.216 The adoption of such a standard in tort 
law came decades later. Thus, Professor Feldman argues: 
“Whereas today, lawyers and judges often invoke the reasonable 
person as a generalized legal standard establishing an individ-
ual’s duty of care in a wide variety of circumstances, jurists dur-
ing the early decades of nationhood discerned duties of care as 
established in the status-relationships of the disputants.”217 
The usage in constitutional interpretation, however, is dif-
ferent than usage for a tort standard of care. It is a gloss on a 
modern interpretive task. It seeks to impose a sort of standard 
on the interpretation of constitutional text. Perhaps reasonable 
care to assess what an ordinary citizen might have thought 
about constitutional text is the best that can be expected of 
judges. A different criticism, though, is that to interpret text 
based on a concept of reasonableness could add a veneer of ob-
jectivity to an enterprise that is anything but. After all, a rea-
sonable person, or the Framers themselves, may have under-
stood phrases in a document like the Constitution to express 
familiar concepts from pre-existing sources, like the English Bill 
of Rights, and not based on commonplace meaning of the words 
and phrases in everyday vernacular. What a reasonable person 
thought about suspension of habeas corpus may not be as in-
formative as the desire to prevent suspensions of certain types 
that had occurred for centuries in England. Another reason to 
overlay reasonableness to describe the undertaking may be to 
obscure the uncertainty of the task, and the relative lack of his-
torical information or expertise that lawyers and judges have to 
undertake it. Reasonableness provides a very low bar for any 
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seeking to justify an argument about the original meaning of the 
Constitution. All that must be invoked is a reasonable approxi-
mation for what a person might have thought of the language at 
the time, without strong evidence for what drafters or other rel-
evant individuals actually thought about legal concepts or con-
stitutional rights. Similarly, judges would have a low bar by 
which their rulings would have to be justified, perhaps far lower 
than the bar if they had to articulate support in precedent, pol-
icy, or other constitutional norms. Without criticizing or endors-
ing reasonable-ordinary-speaker approaches, if it does adopt a 
reasonableness bar, it resembles the low reasonableness bar 
adopted in many other modern constitutional contexts. 
B. HARMONIZING OR OBSCURING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
In some contexts, a move to reasonableness review has been 
a move away from examining the subjective motivations of gov-
ernment actors, whether they be executive actors, legislators, or 
judges. In general, one might expect such a move to be a useful 
and more objective mode of constitutional review. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes might applaud this as a form of tracking the 
development of the common law from standards focused on ret-
ribution and blameworthiness towards objective standards of 
care.218 Thus, negligence standards are not adopted “for the pur-
pose of improving men’s hearts, but . . . to give a man a fair 
chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible for 
it,” in order to “reconcile the reasonable freedom of others with 
the protection of the individual from injury.”219 That, in consti-
tutional law, judges would follow the same path might suggest 
more objective guides have been located to better provide notice 
to government officials and members of the public. Yet constitu-
tional law is not private law—constitutional reasonableness 
standards rarely look like negligence or criminal law mens rea 
standards. The use of the word reasonable in standards for deci-
sion and for review can disguise the lack of objective criteria 
used, or the maintenance of quite subjective standards masquer-
ading as reasonable. Constitutional reasonableness often stands 
in for a range of considerations that vary from one to another. 
While a move towards objective standards of care might be ben-
eficial in some areas, that is not typically so, and the result 
 
 218. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 115 (Transaction 
Publishers 2005) (1881). 
 219. Id. 
 108 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:61 
 
makes for confused constitutional law and still more troubling 
decisions as lower courts apply this doctrine.  
One response by some scholars is that even if many reason-
ableness standards are largely a fig leaf, they are a useful sec-
ond-best in an imprecise and imperfect world. They have argued 
that reasonableness standards can beneficially harmonize dis-
parate standards, whether they are standards of care or stand-
ards of review, by at least giving them a common label.220 Thus, 
a defender of the reasonable person standard in tort law would 
point to its unifying power, even if, in practice, what is reasona-
ble is highly fact-dependent and will require fact-sensitive and 
industry-sensitive judgments.221 An additional feature of such a 
defense may be an argument that no further precision in the doc-
trine can fairly be demanded. Those arguments have some real 
merit. 
Thus, Professor David Zaring has argued that, in adminis-
trative law, a multiplicity of standards of review can apply to 
agency action, but that in practice, they are inconsistently ap-
plied, whether it is Chevron review or rationality review or hard-
look review, and that the doctrine “at least as it actually exists,” 
is really “something more like a ‘reasonable agency’ standard.”222 
Calling disparate standards a single reasonableness standard 
may be more intellectually honest, in such a view—it simplifies 
the law and better describes the actual practice. It results in 
fewer ornate or even “impossible” sets of standards of review, 
and prevents judges from drawing “obscure curtains” across the 
doctrine.223 A counter-argument, however, is that reasonable-
ness would then serve as a fig leaf, or a way to sweep under the 
rug, a great deal of uncertainty in how to review agency action. 
Naming the standards of review reasonableness review may 
eliminate complex legal fictions, but it would not necessarily fo-
cus judges on the appropriate criteria for review. It would simply 
acknowledge, perhaps, a failed project. 
The problem is different and far greater in constitutional 
law than in administrative law, where across three dimensions, 
reasonableness does not simplify doctrine but instead engenders 
an array of complexities much-criticized rather than appreciated 
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across doctrines and dimensions. That said, some have also ar-
gued that constitutional reasonableness would simplify, rather 
than obscure, the challenges of constitutional interpretation. 
Perhaps most prominently, Professor Akhil Amar has argued 
that the Fourth Amendment should not only be read as a whole 
to embrace a concept of reasonableness, and not just as to the 
“unreasonable search and seizure” portion of it.224 He has argued 
that we can use “constitutional reasonableness” to evaluate “pro-
cedural regularity as well as substantive fairness” and rule-of-
law values as well as “race and class” and “sex” discrimina-
tion.225 
Descriptively, it has become correct that much of constitu-
tional law does reflect reasonableness review—I have described 
just how pervasive constitutional reasonableness has become. 
Perhaps no greater precision can be demanded of complex con-
stitutional balancing. But using the word reasonableness ob-
scures the bewildering array of concepts and legal roles in which 
the review consists. Judges can act as if they are not conducting 
constitutional balancing by using the label of reasonableness. 
Standards can be shifted entirely using the same label of reason-
ableness. Whether using the same word to refer to very different 
standards of care, liability, and review is the best model for con-
stitutional interpretation—and, more specifically, whether 
Fourth Amendment case law provides anything approaching a 
good model for constitutional interpretation—is a highly equivo-
cal question. If it is the system that we have and that will not 
change, far more care must be used to define each type of rea-
sonableness being applied across each dimension. 
C. REASONABLENESS AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Others have criticized the incorporation of reasonableness 
standards into constitutional law for some of the same reasons 
that they have been criticized in common law fields: they invite 
judicial adoption of perspectives that reflect those of the majority 
viewpoint and not the diversity of perspectives and persons be-
ing regulated. One can think of these as dimension-two critiques 
of constitutional reasonableness. Reasonableness standards can 
be an invitation to cognitive bias in resolving the most serious 
problems in our democracy. Professors Dan Kahan, David Hoff-
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man and Donald Braman have written about how jurors re-
sponded to the use of force in the vehicle chase at issue in the 
Supreme Court’s Scott v. Harris decision in a range of ways that 
was, for some sets of values, quite consistent with how the Jus-
tices viewed the car chase.226 One response is that their criticism 
misses a different point: that reasonableness may, as a matter of 
substantive Fourth Amendment law, reflect an objective stand-
ard of care but that it is not one for jurors to freely opine upon. 
In fact, the Supreme Court moved towards reasonableness in 
both Fourth Amendment law, and more importantly, along di-
mension three, in qualified immunity law precisely to empower 
judges to take such questions away from juries.227 
Reasonableness, in that view, is a tool for judicial control—
a way to make more questions of law that can be resolved by a 
judge on summary judgment or before a criminal trial. It is a tool 
for judicial control that has the appearance of deferring to com-
munity norms without actually doing so. Jury reasonableness 
standards are, ideally, at least based on a theory of lay decision-
making. But, for the most part, constitutional reasonableness 
standards do not reflect objective standards of care. They instead 
reflect the rulings of reasonable judges. Some applaud this. Pro-
fessors Lawson and Seidman argue: 
If, however, constitutional meaning depends upon a distinctively legal 
construct such as the reasonable person, as we maintain, then deter-
mining constitutional meaning is more properly the province of legal 
experts. The people best able to glean the legally-constructed thoughts 
of a legally-constructed person are likely to be lawyers and legal schol-
ars. Historians, psychologists, and linguists may have something, and 
even much, to contribute to this legal enterprise, but constitutional in-
terpretation remains a distinctively legal, rather than a distinctively 
historical, linguistic, or psychological, task.228 
Perhaps the federal courts are at their most candid, if least 
helpful, towards development of the law when they say that con-
stitutional rights and remedies are available only when reason-
able jurists would provide them. That move is less a slide into 
subjectivity than into judicial solipsism. The goal is to give 
judges discretion and insulate their rulings from review, under 
the guise of objectivity. To question such a ruling would be to 
question the reasonableness of a judge. 
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A seemingly simple concept of deference, however, can pro-
duce highly complex doctrine. At the Supreme Court level, shift-
ing membership and judicial approaches among the Justices can 
result in ever more complex rulings interpreting reasonableness, 
with varying rules and exceptions across each of the dimensions 
explored. More broadly, even if the Justices appreciate the clar-
ity that reasonableness standards can provide, if seemingly 
bright-line standards of care become eroded through inconsist-
encies, such as subjective exceptions, shifting objects, or reme-
dial rules, then the clarity supplied may only be superficial. 
While this can be a challenge in any area in which legal stand-
ards must be interpreted, the concept of reasonableness can dis-
guise especially deep disagreements between the Justices con-
cerning the constitutional balancing tests adopted, including 
questions as fundamental as whose interests are to be taken into 
account. As Professor Kit Kinports argues, the Court has used 
concepts of reasonableness that have “shifted opportunistically 
among different perspectives, based on neither the principles un-
derlying the constitutional provisions at issue nor the attributes 
of the tests themselves.”229 Unfortunately, that tradition is en-
demic across a wide range of constitutional doctrines. The prob-
lems become magnified in the lower courts, as judges struggle to 
apply these rules to complex fact situations, in which it really 
matters whether the test is objective or subjective or reflects 
standards of care or not. Reasonableness begets highly unrea-
sonable doctrine and results. 
IV.  TOWARDS A REGULATORY REASONABLENESS   
Across a large body of constitutional law, reasonableness 
doctrines look patently unreasonable in their application and 
even in their definition. This need not be so. As Professor An-
thony Amsterdam famously wrote about the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness test adopted by the Supreme Court in Katz v. 
United States, “In the end, the basis of the Katz decision seems 
to be that the [F]ourth [A]mendment protects those interests 
that may justifiably claim [F]ourth [A]mendment protection.”230 
That statement leaves us where we left off in Part III of this Ar-
ticle, with a defense of constitutional reasonableness as perhaps 
the best the courts can be expected to do, but still a self-referen-
tial standard with very little content. Professor Amsterdam, 
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however, moved from the Court’s approach to a new one and ad-
vocated a positive change in focus in Fourth Amendment law. He 
argued for a regulatory model, in which police discretion would 
be informed and confined by written police practices and legisla-
tion, within Fourth Amendment limits.231 Specifically, the goal 
of the constitutional right would be not just to protect “specific 
interests of specific individuals” whose rights were abused, but 
also to “regulat[e] police practices broadly, generally[,] and di-
rectly.”232 The goal is for a constitutional standard to inform and 
supplement regulatory policies, but for the Constitution to not 
be the sole protection. 
Such an approach permits constitutional reasonableness to 
be informed by industry practices, policy, and regulation, and to 
in turn credit sound practices, policy, and regulation. That regu-
latory approach better resembles the administrative review doc-
trines that Professor David Zaring endorses, where deference is 
due to empirically informed administrative fact-finding.233 I 
strongly agree with such a use of reasonableness standards and 
have argued that, in general, constitutional reasonableness can 
and should actually refer to objective and informed standards of 
care, as it can sometimes do in the tort context. Reasonableness 
should refer to objective standards, not actions by individuals 
under particularized circumstances. In short, many of the en-
demic problems identified in Parts I, II, and III of this Article 
can be addressed through a regulatory concept of constitutional 
reasonableness. In this Part, I hope to show why that concept 
improves on existing doctrine, why it is compatible with existing 
doctrine, and why it can solve still additional puzzles and diffi-
culties in existing constitutional law. I will also discuss im-
portant and quite serious objections to such a concept of consti-
tutional review, including that there may not be agreed upon 
best practices, empirical evidence may conflict, practices may be 
changing and improving over time, and such questions may be 
better suited to legislators making policy decisions rather than 
administrative agencies or local government. 
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A. A REGULATORY CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS 
What would a regulatory or empirically informed reasona-
bleness look like in the areas of constitutional law discussed in 
this Article? Professor Anthony Amsterdam argued that we 
should not have a system in which “the Constitution is our one 
instrument for keeping the police within the rule of law.”234 In-
stead, constitutional rulings should set “minimum standards” 
and areas of concern as well as “inform and monitor” enforce-
ment, but police should have primary responsibility for regulat-
ing themselves.235 Amsterdam urged a rule of constitutional law 
wherein the Fourth Amendment would (1) presumptively find a 
search or seizure constitutional if it was conducted pursuant ei-
ther to legislation or to police department rules and regulations; 
(2) require that the statutes or police rules be “reasonably par-
ticular” in setting out the permissible bounds of police searches 
and seizures; and (3) require that those statutes or rules be con-
sistent with existing Fourth Amendment requirements.236  
Such an approach resembles an administrative law regime 
where there is deference to an administrative agency (here, local 
police agencies or state legislatures) if they make policy deci-
sions within reasonable bounds. The approach rewards sound 
self-regulation and defers to best practices, but the federal courts 
would be tasked with reviewing those regulations and may find 
outlier approaches violative. The approach reduces arbitrariness 
without imposing a detailed code of procedure. Scholars who rec-
ommend administrative law approaches to criminal procedure 
generally now favor such approaches, which take some of the 
weight from constitutional interpretation. The courts, Amster-
dam recommended, could instead incline more towards a “re-
quirement of police-made rules judicially reviewable for reason-
ableness.”237 Rather than defer to individual officer action as 
reasonable or not, the starting place would be on regulation. 
More constitutional review would look like review of regulations 
or of legislation, based on empirically-informed assessments of 
policy—not just of individual action.  
A generation of new-administrativist scholars has advanced 
such an approach more broadly in a range of areas in which ex-
pert administrative agencies do not currently exist to sufficiently 
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protect constitutional rights.238 To be sure, some of that scholar-
ship neglects to consider that, in some areas, there are already 
agencies tasked with protection of constitutional rights. Take the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, or 
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Some 
scholarship, then, critically assesses the role of such agencies in 
developing regulations to define and protect constitutional 
rights, or imagines a more robust role for those agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels to protect constitutional rights.239 
Another strain of this area of legal scholarship has advo-
cated that administrative law norms be extended to areas in 
which regulation is largely lacking, such as within prosecutors’ 
offices, an area explored by Professors Rachel Barkow, Stepha-
nos Bibas, Gerard Lynch, Daniel Richman, and others.240 That 
scholarship, while diverse, in part assesses existing government 
institutions and asks whether additional procedures and norms 
could better regulate those institutions. In addition, a wide 
range of new-governance scholarship has asked, for more than 
two decades, whether rulemaking and regulation could be better 
informed by democratic participation combined with rigorous as-
sessment of best practices.241 
Yet another strain of scholarship emphasizes that individ-
ual case-specific adjudication is inadequate to address systemic 
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problems that arise in government programs. Professor Tracey 
L. Meares has described how “individual-level analysis” is not 
suitable for addressing systemic law enforcement programs like 
stop-and-frisk.242 I have argued that individual review using ap-
pellate or post-conviction review is not suitable for addressing 
systemic errors in criminal adjudication, as has Professor Eve 
Brensike Primus.243 A range of solutions have been proposed to 
these problems. I have suggested that aggregate or class action-
style regulation might better address systemic issues, or that ad-
ministrative agencies outside the courts might better regulate 
such questions.244 Professor Andrew Crespo has argued that sys-
temic data might better be harnessed by courts.245 Others have 
focused on incentivizing democratic rulemaking by government 
actors themselves.246 In addition, scholars have argued social 
science and empirical research should more generally inform 
constitutional rights or constitutional criminal procedure, in-
cluding in more complex hybrid models, in which courts serve a 
role in overseeing experimentation by government actors.247  
One objection to such deference is that not all agencies de-
serve the deference that they might receive; for example, some 
questions may not be well informed by policy or research. Local 
law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to conduct 
research, or even spend much time assessing existing research 
in the way that a federal agency can do. Nor are there industry 
groups that typically conduct major research projects on topics 
related to a range of civil rights. Professor Ronald Allen has ar-
gued that police rules do not deserve deference, since they do not 
have expertise, they may not be agencies that are very account-
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able to the public, and, ultimately, such questions would be bet-
ter settled through legislation.248 There is also the danger that 
courts are not well situated to evaluate scientific research even 
when good research has been conducted. The story of the devel-
opment of constitutional rights in a range of contexts has been 
the story of the courts disregarding scientific research that coun-
seled very different protections for constitutional rights. 
One advantage of regulatory reasonableness review is that 
it can, in theory, generate more detailed and informed regula-
tion. That is why scholars since the 1970s have argued that a 
regulatory model can empower judicial review, but also limit it 
and inform judicial deference to agencies. Professors Barry 
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have argued that policing is 
poorly regulated by courts and that courts should instead incen-
tivize review by agencies, in similar ways to those proposed by 
Professor Anthony Amsterdam, in the Fourth Amendment con-
text, and Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, in the policing context 
more generally.249  
For an example, take Fourth Amendment use-of-force 
standards. The Fourth Amendment provides a general right to 
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”250 Professor 
Seth Stoughton and I, along with many others, have criticized 
the Supreme Court for focusing the reasonableness inquiry in 
that context on the split-second in which the officer decides to 
use force.251 The Court has emphasized that there are no bright 
line rules or even clear standards, so that officers may use deadly 
force so long as it is objectively reasonable to do so in the circum-
stances of each case.252 Such an approach certainly limits civil 
liability of officers. But it does not provide any guidance for of-
ficers or police supervisors, who instead adopt detailed policies 
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designed to minimize the need to use force generally, and to pre-
vent the need to use deadly force. Such police tactics are part of 
the training of any reasonable police officer. Officers should be 
held to the standards of their profession, and not to a rock-bot-
tom constitutional floor where any split-second reaction is 
deemed reasonable, no matter how rash or preventable through 
prior actions. We call for an empirically grounded constitutional 
reasonableness in the use of force context, asking whether police 
officers followed sound policy and training to minimize the need 
to use force and deescalate. If deadly force was not avoidable, 
then officers should not be liable, but officers should be liable 
(really, the agencies that indemnify the individual officers) for 
unnecessary use of deadly force. The reasonable officer reacting 
in the moment is replaced by the reasonably trained officer, and 
the focus is on systemic questions of police training, rather than 
on the individual circumstances at the moment deadly force was 
used. 
Other constitutional rights can benefit from an empirically 
informed focus on the general, not the specific, circumstances 
and on industry norms rather than individual preferences. In 
criminal procedure, other objective reasonableness standards 
can and should be informed by research on what a reasonably 
trained officer would do. Whether an individual can consent to a 
search or voluntarily agree to be interrogated should be informed 
by research on the vulnerability of, for example, the mentally ill 
and juveniles. Officers should not be off the hook if they subjec-
tively had no idea that the suspect was mentally ill or disabled 
or a juvenile. Sound training on such questions should be ex-
pected—and it will be if the constitutional reasonableness stand-
ard creates that expectation. 
Turning to civil rights, rational basis review could be better 
informed by a regulatory reasonableness standard. That is, alt-
hough deference will be due to any potentially reasonable legis-
lative determination, if there is factual evidence of bias or ani-
mus, then the Supreme Court has been correct to tighten the 
inquiry into the goals served by the legislation. Thus, scholars 
have argued that in Lawrence, the Court correctly emphasized 
that an anti-sodomy statute “furthers no legitimate state inter-
est which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private 
life of the individual.”253 While the Court has sometimes stated 
that “the theory of rational-basis review . . . does not require the 
 
 253. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Araiza, supra note 129. 
 118 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:61 
 
State to place any evidence in the record,” such evidence should 
be put in the record if the plaintiff has some evidence or arbitrary 
or discriminatory motive.254 There should be a burden-shifting 
analysis, even in the context of rational basis review; such a shift 
in the burden may explain why the Court sometimes appears to 
add teeth to rational basis review. Considering the factual record 
should be more routine when constitutional rights are at stake, 
and burden shifting can help to sort out cases deserving more 
careful inquiry. 
Areas in which reasonableness informs a standard of review 
and refers to a probability, could also be informed by a regulatory 
concept. Research could inform the question whether an event is 
reasonably probable or not. If the question is whether a jury rea-
sonably was affected by the lawyer’s failure to challenge a con-
fession, a court could take notice of studies examining the ques-
tion, and it could be expected to adopt general rules regulating 
lawyers and insisting that they litigate questions of real im-
portance to jurors. Or, take the reasonably probable standard for 
determining whether a violation of Brady v. Maryland by prose-
cutors deserves reversal of a conviction. If a prosecutor’s office 
does not have clear policy or training on the Brady obligation to 
provide exculpatory evidence to the defense, or if that policy was 
violated, perhaps that should inform the constitutional analysis. 
The Supreme Court itself has stated that its rule “requires less 
of the prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
which call generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence 
tending to exculpate or mitigate.”255 Many commentators have 
similarly criticized the Brady rule as toothless, where prosecu-
tors can make their own judgments whether evidence is suffi-
ciently material to turn over to the defense. Rather than defer to 
those judgments using after-the-fact reasonableness review, a 
court could first ask what the prosecutor’s policy is on disclosure 
of exculpatory or impeachment evidence. If that policy was itself 
reasonable and followed, prosecutors would benefit from defer-
ence. If not, though, the Court would conduct further review.  
Similarly, reasonableness rules that relate to questions of 
proportionality could also adopt a more regulatory posture. It 
might not be enough to defer to a reasonable decision to keep a 
person in indefinite civil commitment; the Court might instead 
expect an empirically informed policy and set of regulations for 
assessing whether individuals in general pose a risk and should 
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be kept in ongoing civil confinement. Absent such a validated 
policy and regulations, even a seemingly sensible individual de-
cision should not be approved, given the lack of a sound frame-
work for making such decisions. 
One area in which the Court has adopted such an approach 
deferring to regulatory expertise provides a set of quite caution-
ary lessons. The Supreme Court held in the context of constitu-
tional challenges to prison regulations, including burdens on 
First Amendment rights, to the right to marry, and other rights, 
that such regulations are valid if “reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests.”256 The Court explicitly adopted a 
regulatory model in that context, or at least seemed to do so ini-
tially, when the standard was first developed in the 1970s. The 
Court explained that such a standard is necessary if “prison ad-
ministrators . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult 
judgments concerning institutional operations.”257 The Court 
saw the need for such an approach where the challenge is made 
directly to regulations that burden constitutional rights (or to 
statutes that benefit from rational-basis deference).  
However, the development of the law and remedies in the 
area of prison-conditions litigation resulted in rulings that better 
resemble blanket deference to prison administrators than any 
model of regulatory reasonableness.258 In the lower courts, often 
any reason given by prison officials is seen as an objective and 
legitimate, or reasonable, basis for a prison policy.259 The doc-
trine was developed during a time when federal courts and the 
Supreme Court had begun to turn away from structural reform 
litigation and oversight of public institutions, and so the Su-
preme Court highlighted the need to “maintain institutional se-
curity”260 and the “complex and intractable” problems of prison 
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administration “not readily susceptible of resolution by de-
cree.”261 Making the law still more restrictive, Congress later 
stepped in with legislation to narrow remedies in prison condi-
tions cases in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.262  
Thus, in the Eighth Amendment area, the federal courts do 
not ask careful questions about whether the prison administra-
tors adopt policies that are the least restrictive, or most justified, 
or supported by evidence.263 They could be required to do so, but 
the Supreme Court had increasingly emphasized deference in 
the area, and then Congress has stepped in. While the area could 
have been one in which regulatory reasonableness would result 
in a body of informed regulation, the area instead resulted in 
largely rote deference to prison administrators. The experience 
in that area suggests that regulatory reasonableness has to be 
taken seriously by judges, the relevant regulators, and legisla-
tors. Judges must actually inquire into whether the regulation 
or rule is supported by evidence. Clear rules requiring objective 
support to be offered by regulators for their regulations must be 
set out. Otherwise, the entire effort may degenerate into blanket 
deference. 
B. REGULATORY OBJECTS OF REASONABLENESS 
Significant confusion in constitutional law flows from uncer-
tainty about which actor’s conduct should be assessed for its rea-
sonableness. There should be a preference (if not a rule) on this 
question for a given constitutional right and it should not simply 
be up to whichever court happens to be reviewing a claim to de-
cide on whom to place the burden upon. The problem disappears, 
however, if reasonableness is assessed on a general level, and 
based on standards of care instead of individual preferences or 
circumstances. I have argued that a regulatory or systemic focus 
is typically preferable for questions of constitutional importance. 
If a police officer must be trained on how to identify a mentally 
ill person, then it does not matter whether the officer was con-
fused, even reasonably so, by the actions of a particular mentally 
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ill person. If the officer did not follow the steps that sound train-
ing would recommend to identify such a person, then the per-
spectives of that officer and that suspect do not matter. The 
standard would focus on general standards of care—obviating 
the need for byzantine and case-specific rules about who should 
reasonably have said and done what during a multi-step encoun-
ter.  
C. REGULATORY REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
When courts use reasonableness standards to inform review 
of constitutional rights or to determine whether a remedy is ap-
propriate, that review should be informed by objective and em-
pirical sources, and not just whatever the reviewing judge calls 
reasonable. Take the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Courts 
typically defer to performance of counsel based on some notion 
that it fell within the range of acceptable strategic decisions, or 
it likely did not prejudice the outcome at trial.264 That analysis 
could be actually objective, and not just based on judges’ hunches 
as to what might have happened, had the lawyer done the job 
differently. That is, empirical evidence could inform the analy-
sis, based on studies of jury behavior and assessment of trial ev-
idence. I have argued that the Sixth Amendment can and should 
be validated through such an evidence-based approach.265 
More generally, the analogous reasonableness standards 
built into harmless error review of constitutional rights asserted 
in criminal cases on appeal and post-conviction are susceptible 
to better-informed empirical research. Scholars have proposed 
empirical methods for harmless-error analysis, for example, to 
use jury research to inform harmless-error determinations.266 A 
large body of research has described how difficult it is to expect 
judges to engage in counterfactual reasoning, asking how a trial 
would have come out differently absent a constitutional error, 
and putting to one side evidence of guilt that may bias a judge to 
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confirm the prior outcome.267 Whether judges will take evidence-
based analysis seriously is more equivocal, but it would improve 
upon reasonableness rubber-stamping. 
The appropriate level of deference to regulations also raises 
important issues. Controversies over when and whether federal 
judges should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes under the Chevron doctrine have engendered a vast schol-
arship and complex case law.268 Moreover, agencies can be pre-
sumed to have expertise, as well as delegated authority, 
regarding statutes concerning their own regulatory authority, 
but perhaps not constitutional rights, which raise very different 
separation of powers concerns regarding the judicial obligation 
to ensure that the Constitution is followed.  
Several guideposts can nevertheless be set out here. One re-
sponse to the criticism that judges would abdicate their role to 
defer to administrative regulations regarding constitutional 
rights is that judges already engage in broad deference, but are 
not informed by adequate information. Offering no reasonable-
ness deference when an agency has no regulation at all on a sub-
ject touching on constitutional rights seems like a logical place 
to start. Taking away the benefit of reasonableness deference, 
whether regarding the definition of the violation or whether a 
remedy should result, when the agency does not provide eviden-
tiary support for its regulation, would also be a fairly easy prin-
ciple for judges to administer. Whether a constitutional violation 
can be insulated by a regulation that appears reasonable but was 
not followed will raise important questions regarding the reach 
of constitutional remedies. Perhaps no defense should be avail-
ing in such circumstances.  
The more difficult situations will arise where government 
officials say they were following a regulation. They might even 
have a regulation parroting the constitutional floor: “Police offic-
ers shall use deadly force when reasonable to do so under the 
totality of the circumstances.”269 That policy is close to none at 
 
 267. Id. at 1411; D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error Anal-
ysis: How Do Judges Respond to Confession Errors, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151 
(2012). 
 268. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see, 
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chev-
ron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006). 
 269. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 2017] CONSTITUTIONAL REASONABLENESS 123 
 
all, but they might then add: “[w]e believe that this policy is 
highly effective and better than the alternatives.” A judge should 
ask what evidence supports that conclusion. If lawmakers or reg-
ulators do adopt rules designed to prevent constitutional viola-
tions, but there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning their 
effectiveness, then perhaps the reasonableness issue should be 
litigated just as in a tort suit. The fact finder can decide whether 
a minimalistic policy truly is a reasonable policy that can protect 
individual constitutional rights. In constitutional tort cases, de-
tailed questions are already asked whether an official acted rea-
sonably, but without much content concerning what that 
means.270 Adding the fact that a rule or regulation was ad-
dressed to the situation in which the constitutional right was al-
legedly violated could at least add more content to the litigation. 
In many areas, such practices do inform the fact finding concern-
ing whether a constitutional violation occurred and deserves a 
remedy.271 
Whether a regulatory vision of reasonableness could supple-
ment, or even supplant, rational basis review raises more diffi-
cult questions. If the government has no regulation at all in 
place, perhaps that should be presumptively irrational, but typ-
ically (outside of the criminal justice setting in which agencies so 
often lack detailed regulations) there is a policy or a statute be-
ing challenged as unconstitutional. Whether a more evidence-
based approach, focusing on best practices and effectiveness, 
could inform review is a broader question. If the purpose of ra-
tional basis review is to, apart from explicit animus, broadly de-
fer to legislative and administrative policy expertise, then a reg-
ulatory model of reasonableness would serve no useful role. If 
the goal is to test government justifications factually, to at least 
some degree, then a more evidence-based approach would be 
warranted.  
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, I have developed three dimensions of consti-
tutional reasonableness. Within each there are, in turn, a range 
of alternative approaches and usages of a reasonableness test. 
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First, reasonableness can be used with conceptions that are ob-
jective, subjective, utility-based, or custom-based, sometimes 
with more than one usage in the context of a particular right. 
Second, as to the objects of reasonableness standards, they may 
be institutional or individualized and assessed from the perspec-
tive of judges, officials, legislators, or citizens. Third, the stand-
ard may apply to a right or to an assertion of defenses, or waiv-
ers, or remedial limitations, or standards of review, or 
potentially blurring the distinctions between each of these.  
For a wonderfully candid assessment of the uncertainties 
that can result from such reasonableness doctrine, read this de-
scription from a treatise on municipal ordinances: 
It is impossible to be didactic, or even precise, in discussing the rule 
that an ordinance must be reasonable to be valid. The decision as to 
the reasonableness of any type of regulation depends a great deal on 
subjective factors—the temperament and experience of the judges, 
their attitude toward society and particularly toward the activity con-
cerned, their training, education and other personal traits.272 
One pities the municipal lawyer that must explain the standard 
to the city officials concerned about passing valid ordinances. Or, 
as Chief Judge Roger Traynor put it in his classic treatment of 
harmless-error doctrine: “The nebulous test of reasonableness is 
unlikely to foster uniformity either in the application of stand-
ards, should there be any, or in the pragmatic exercise of discre-
tion.”273 
Yet constitutional reasonableness is here to stay. It is the 
glue that holds together vastly disparate constitutional provi-
sions and standards. As Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Mar-
ceau put it, “it is unlikely that any area of law lacks a reasona-
bleness test at the center of a core doctrine.”274 Pervasive 
constitutional borrowing has led the Court to pull reasonable-
ness standards from civil to criminal settings, from discrimina-
tion law to free speech law, from standards of care to standards 
for relief on appeal or in habeas corpus petitions. In many of 
those areas, the indeterminate and even circular nature of the 
constitutional reasonableness standard can be a source of its 
strength. If a reasonable official must actually adhere to objec-
tively sound practices, then officials have standards to follow 
and the public knows what to expect. If it is judges, though, call-
ing conduct reasonable post hoc, without setting any standards 
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of care, then reasonableness turns into a form of blanket defer-
ence that does not inform officials or give the public clear guid-
ance on what their rights actually are. 
If only judges kept the three dimensions of constitutional 
reasonableness distinct, we might not see varying stacked con-
cepts of reasonableness doing double or triple duty, for the adju-
dication of even a single federal constitutional claim. That the 
proliferation of these reasonableness standards has become ac-
cepted suggests to what a degree we have become accustomed to 
these usages. They disguise entirely separate dimensions of in-
terpretive and remedial choices, however. Decisions that adopt 
entirely irreconcilable approaches can claim to be applying the 
same reasonableness doctrine. These doctrines should be un-
packed and distinguished, even if in practice they can overlap 
and confuse. Better yet, federal judges should avoid using rea-
sonableness as a fig leaf to disguise the rights and values they 
interpret and balance. Using different terms for different con-
cepts would be a welcome change, even if the umbrella term rea-
sonableness remains so attractive that it is retained.  
Still better, under the model that I advance, and that others 
have developed in contexts such as the Fourth Amendment, and 
which the Supreme Court uses in certain contexts already, con-
stitutional interpretation could incentivize evidence-informed 
practices. That is, the salutary role reasonableness is supposed 
to serve in the negligence context: incentivizing reasonable 
standards of care. A range of scholars have advanced a new focus 
on regulatory models to better adopt systemic and empirically 
informed regulation to protect constitutional rights. There have 
been concerns, though, whether courts have the right cases, or 
access to sufficient data, or institutional ability to incentivize 
such review.275 The experience in the Eighth Amendment prison 
conditions area suggests those concerns can be warranted if 
judges do not carefully adopt a regulatory concept of reasonable-
ness, but rather slide back into an approach that is broadly def-
erential to regulators. Reasonableness review, even if better in-
formed, may be simply too “nebulous,” as Judge Traynor put it, 
to carefully inform doctrine.276 
While taking those concerns seriously, this Article does 
point out just how many doctrines are amenable to a more rigor-
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ous regulatory reasonableness approach. There are many attrac-
tive places in the doctrine in which such an empirically informed 
view of reasonableness could be adopted, now that the doctrine 
is shot through with constitutional reasonableness review. With-
out such a shift, there will be little that is reasonable about con-
stitutional reasonableness. Even if this positive proposal for a 
shift in approach towards an empirically informed model does 
not take hold, I hope the negative and critical aspects of this dis-
cussion may not only illuminate the multiple dimensions that 
reasonableness can operate under, but also how duplication and 
confusion across different aspects of constitutional law can make 
the job of a judge nearly impossible. The doctrine certainly defies 
the expectations of litigants and the public. I have also argued 
that the spread of constitutional reasonableness is understand-
able—if deplorable. The vagueness, flexibility, and malleability 
of reasonableness explains its ubiquity and utility. Today, how-
ever, without committing to any one usage, a judge or court can 
shift the meaning of entire constitutional standards, without 
seeming to change its reasonableness label. That shape-shifting 
ambiguity across multiple dimensions is the source of the power, 
the attraction, and the danger of constitutional reasonableness. 
